Re: [PATCH] Documentation: Extend the real-time hardware bits with some firmware bits
Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.linux-rt-devel,org.kernel.vger.linux-doc,org.kernel.vger.linux-efi,org.trustedfirmware.lists.op-tee |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAGgiveXyOGFY=gyn3ok0p7wtjP_1oY6Q9Jqa6fCYXrwRoNQ=tg@mail.gmail.com> |
Hi, On Fri, Jul 10, 2026 at 9:53 AM Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, 10 Jul 2026 at 10:31, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 2026-07-10 09:29:55 [+0300], Ilias Apalodimas wrote: > > > Hi Sebastian! > > Hi Ilias, > > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/core-api/real-time/hardware.rst > > > > @@ -130,3 +130,95 @@ https://github.com/Linutronix/RTC-Testbench. > > > > > > [...] > > > > > > > + > > > > +OP-TEE (ARM) > > > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > > > That's RISC-V as well nowadays > > > > I did not find much here. Their architecture isn't the same as on ARM is > > it? But the overall concept is the same, right? > > I haven't checked the IRQ vectors on risc-v, but I assume they have a > similar logic since that's an OP-TEE design decision not a per > architecture one. > > > > > > > + > > > > +OP‑TEE uses a global serialization mechanism (the "big lock"), ensuring that on > > > > +each core only one OP‑TEE thread executes secure‑world code at a time. > > > > + > > > > +Execution flows from the normal world (Linux) into the secure world (OP‑TEE) > > > > +through the secure monitor at EL3. Linux and OP‑TEE cannot disable or mask each > > > > +other’s interrupts because both run at EL1 in different security states. > > > > > > That's not always true. It depends on a combination of OP-TEE and TF-A > > > configs iirc. > > > The most common though is that IRQs and FIQs are directly delivered to > > > S-EL1, in which case OP-TEE can mask IRQs. > > > There's also a difference between GICv2 and GICv3 in the way > > > interrupts are delivered. > > > > You are saying that OP-TEE can mask Linux' interrupts or if OP-TEE > > instructs TF-A to do so (via config)? > > OP-TEE can mask Linux IRQs You can find more about interrupts in OP-TEE here https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/core.html#interrupt-handling > > > > > > > + > > > > +Architecturally, the secure monitor can mask or reroute normal‑world interrupts > > > > +before entering the secure world. In a correct OP‑TEE/ TF‑A implementation, it > > > > +does not do this for the duration of secure calls. Normal‑world interrupts > > > > +remain deliverable, and a normal‑world IRQ will preempt OP‑TEE via EL3 and > > > > +return control to Linux. > > > > > > The 'sane' case is indeed where IRQs are delivered to OP-TEE which > > > exits back to Linux immediately. > > > > > > > + > > > > +Secure‑world interrupts (FIQs) are possible if the SoC routes a device's > > > > +interrupt as secure. Such a secure FIQ will preempt Linux immediately, trap > > > > +into EL3, and transfer control to OP‑TEE's secure interrupt handler. Linux > > > > +cannot mask or preempt this. Secure FIQ handlers must therefore be extremely > > > > +short to avoid introducing noticeable latency. > > > > > > There are also 'fast SMCs', which run with IRQs disabled for their > > > entire duration. > > > > can their be distinguished somehow from normal SMC invocations or is > > just a consequence that the secure monitor does not enable interrupts > > during transition for some of the "functions"? > > They can be identified. There's a function identifier defined in the > SMC calling conventions doc [0]. > Bit 31 is always 1 for fast calls and 0 for yielding. This is a calling convention and is not controlled by hardware. There are exceptions for the FF-A SMCs, for instance. Cheers, Jens > > > > > > > + > > > > +The transition from normal world -> secure monitor -> OP‑TEE and back introduces > > > > +additional latency due to world switching and context save/ restore. This > > > > +overhead is typically a few microseconds and usually remains in the noise > > > > +floor. > > > > > > That's correct. > > > > > > > + > > > > +If the secure monitor masks normal‑world interrupts during OP‑TEE invocations, > > > > +or if OP‑TEE uses long‑running secure FIQ handlers, then OP‑TEE can introduce > > > > +measurable latency spikes. > > > > -- > > > > 2.53.0 > > > > > > > > > > Overall I think this is worth documenting, but infortunately there's a > > > wider range of configs and corner cases we have to describe. > > > > Okay. > > [0] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0028/h/?lang=en > > Cheers > /Ilias > > > > > Cheers > > > /Ilias > > > > Sebastian