Re: [patch 00/18] entry: Consolidate and rework syscall entry handling

Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya <[email protected]>
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Message-ID <[email protected]>
On Tue, Jul 07, 2026 at 09:05:53PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Sorry for the long CC list, but this is a treewide change.
> 
> Michal recently posted a RFC patch to separate the potential syscall number
> modifications in syscall_enter_user_mode_work() from the information
> whether the syscall should be processed and the return value modified:
> 
>   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
> 
> The existing logic is:
> 
> arch_syscall()
> 	regs->result = -ENOSYS;
> 
> 	syscallnr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall);
> 
> 	if (syscallnr != -1L)
> 		regs->result = invoke_syscall(regs, syscall;
> 
> syscall_enter_from_user_mode() invokes ptrace, seccomp and
> tracing/BPF/Probes. All of them can modify the syscall number.
> 
> ptrace and seccomp explicitly set the syscall number to -1L to indicate
> that the syscall invocation needs to be skipped and the result has not to
> be modified as it might have been modified by ptrace or seccomp. The
> tracer/BPF/Probes mechanism can modify the syscall number as well and
> relies implicitly on the -1L logic.
> 
> This can obviously not be differentiated from a syscall invocation where
> userspace provided -1 as syscall number.
> 
> The general agreement of the discussion was that the current mechanism,
> while functionally correct is non-intuitive and something like Michals
> proposal would make that code clearer and easier to handle on the
> architecture side:
> 
> arch_syscall()
> 	regs->result = -ENOSYS;
> 
> 	if (syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, &syscall)) 
> 		regs->result = invoke_syscall(regs, syscall;
> 
> That discussion made me look deeper into the related code and as usual
> there were a lot of other things to discover.
> 
>   1) Stack randomization
> 
>      add_random_kstack_offset() can only be invoked after
>      enter_from_user_mode() established proper state as it calls into
>      instrumentable code.
> 
>      PowerPC got that wrong and the other architectures either invoke it
>      after enter_from_user_mode() or after syscall_enter_from_user_mode().
> 
>      The latter is suboptimal as the randomization takes place after all
>      the user mode entry work. Aside of that add_random_kstack_offset()
>      uses get/put_cpu_var(), which makes it usable in preemptible code, but
>      when invoked in the interrupt disabled region that's pointless
>      overhead.
> 
>   2) As discussed in the above thread just changing the function signature
>      of syscall_enter_from_user_mode[_work]() so they take a pointer
>      argument for the syscall and then return 0 on success is not really
>      intuitive either. Aside of that this breaks the implicit assumption of
>      the tracer when setting the syscall number to -1.
> 
>   3) The x86 entry code has some historically accumulated oddities
> 
> The following series addresses this by:
> 
>   1) Providing new [syscall_]enter_from_user_mode() variants, which include
>      stack randomization and utilize a new add_random_kstack_offset_irqsoff()
>      variant, which avoids the get/put_cpu_var() overhead and converting all
>      usage sites over
> 
>   2) Picking up Jinjie's seccomp patch from:
> 
>      https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
> 
>      and addressing the feedback (renaming the seccomp functions)
> 
>   3) Making the ptrace and tracer related functions return a boolean value
>      to indicate syscall permission
> 
>   4) Addressing the x86 oddities
> 
>   5) Converting the tree over to the new scheme
> 
> With that all architectures using the generic syscall entry code follow the
> same scheme, apply stack randomization at the correct and earliest possible
> place and skip syscall processing depending on the boolean return value of
> syscall_enter_from_user_mode[_work]().
> 
> There should be no functional changes, at least there are none intended.
> 
> The resulting text size for the syscall entry code on x8664 is slightly
> smaller than before these changes.
> 
> Testing syscall heavy workloads and micro benchmarks shows a small
> performance gain for the general rework, but the last patch, which changes
> the logic to be more understandable has no measurable impact in either
> direction.
> 
> The series applies on Linus tree and is also available from git:
> 
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/devel.git entry-rework-v1
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	tglx
> ---
>  Documentation/core-api/entry.rst      |   33 +++++---
>  arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c            |    4 -
>  arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c              |    2 
>  arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c              |    4 -
>  arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c            |    4 -
>  arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c             |    4 -
>  arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c           |    2 
>  arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c       |   17 +---
>  arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c             |    4 -
>  arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c       |    2 
>  arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c             |    4 -
>  arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c            |    2 
>  arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c         |    2 
>  arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c           |   12 +--
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c         |    5 -
>  arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c             |   14 +--
>  arch/s390/kernel/syscall.c            |   11 +-
>  arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c            |    4 -
>  arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c         |    2 
>  arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c         |    2 
>  arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c               |    2 
>  arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c         |    2 
>  arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c           |   70 +++++++------------
>  arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c           |   61 ++++++----------
>  arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c |   14 +--
>  arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h   |    1 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h        |   10 --
>  arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c           |    5 -
>  include/asm-generic/syscall.h         |    4 -
>  include/linux/entry-common.h          |  125 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
>  include/linux/irq-entry-common.h      |    6 -
>  include/linux/ptrace.h                |   13 +--
>  include/linux/randomize_kstack.h      |   19 +++++
>  include/linux/seccomp.h               |   12 +--
>  kernel/entry/syscall-common.c         |    7 +
>  kernel/seccomp.c                      |   35 ++++-----
>  36 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> linux-snps-arc mailing list
> [email protected]
> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

Boot tested this on P11 LPAR and P9 powernv system.
Tested-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <[email protected]>
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