Re: [PATCH 0/2] ntfs3: fix OOB read and integer overflow in run_unpack()

Hi Konstantin,

Great news! 

Will I get a CVE for that memory leak? 

Can you credit the patch and CVE to “Tiefgang Security Labs”? 

[email protected]

Cheers,

Tobias


> On Apr 7, 2026, at 10:19, Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On 3/29/26 13:17, tobgaertner wrote:
> 
>> [You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
>> 
>> From: Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
>> 
>> Two bugs in run_unpack() found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness
>> (LibAFL + QEMU ARM64 system-mode):
>> 
>> Patch 1: run_unpack() checks `run_buf < run_last` at the loop top but
>> then reads size_size and offset_size bytes via run_unpack_s64() without
>> verifying they fit in the remaining buffer.  A crafted NTFS image with
>> truncated run data triggers a heap OOB read of up to 15 bytes on mount.
>> 
>> Patch 2: The volume boundary check `lcn + len > sbi->used.bitmap.nbits`
>> uses raw addition that can wrap for large values, bypassing the
>> validation.  CVE-2025-40068 added check_add_overflow() for adjacent
>> arithmetic but missed this instance.
>> 
>> Both bugs are present since NTFS3 was merged in 5.15.
>> 
>> Could CVE IDs be assigned for these two issues?
>> 
>> tobgaertner (2):
>>   ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()
>>   ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check
>> 
>>  fs/ntfs3/run.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>> 
>> --
>> 2.43.0
>> 
> Hello,
> 
> Patches are queued for the next merge window, thanks.
> 
> Regards,
> Konstantin
>