[stable] Please backport ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs
sdj asj <[email protected]> Wed, 1 Jul 2026 20:27:36 +0800
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.ntfs3,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAFTRC0=hdHvug9=JyiZ=XYowdpqp9TAgXbq0YpDOEnzmQUWxzQ@mail.gmail.com> |
Hello stable team, Please consider picking up the following upstream commit for supported stable trees where it applies: 5b08dccecf825cbf905f348bc6ccb497507e28e2 ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs Reason for stable: This fixes a user-visible security issue in ntfs3. Before this change, the empty-prefix xattr handler allowed an unprivileged file owner on a writable ntfs3 mount to set the reserved $LXUID, $LXGID and $LXMOD extended attributes directly. These attributes are later trusted by ntfs_get_wsl_perm() during inode reload and used to populate i_uid, i_gid and i_mode. As a result, an unprivileged user can create a file that becomes root-owned and SUID after inode reload. The issue is reproducible using normal syscalls only and does not require a malformed filesystem image. The upstream fix prevents non-privileged users from directly writing these reserved $LX* attributes, while keeping internal ntfs3 metadata updates working. The original issue no longer reproduces with the upstream fix applied. Please apply this to supported stable branches that contain the vulnerable ntfs3 code. Thanks, Zhen