[PATCH] ocfs2: validate root extent tree depth during inode read

[BUG]
A corrupt dinode can carry an extent root whose l_tree_depth exceeds
OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH. When truncate builds a path from that root, OCFS2
hits the internal BUG_ON() in ocfs2_new_path():

kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:686!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_new_path+0x1d5/0x240 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:686
Call Trace:
 ocfs2_commit_truncate+0x29f/0x1aa0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:7253
 ocfs2_truncate_file+0xcdd/0x13c0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:509
 ocfs2_setattr+0xa6d/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1212
 notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546
 do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68
 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline]
 do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline]
 path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
 do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1452 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1468 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1463 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x15b/0x220 fs/open.c:1463
 ...

[CAUSE]
Extent blocks and __ocfs2_find_path() already treat oversized
l_tree_depth values as on-disk corruption, but the dinode root extent
list is never checked when the inode is read.

That lets a corrupt root extent list reach ocfs2_new_path(), which
stores the tree depth in a fixed-size struct ocfs2_path and therefore
expects the root metadata to have been validated already.

[FIX]
Validate the dinode root extent tree depth in ocfs2_validate_inode_block(),
which is the same cold metadata-read boundary where OCFS2 already checks
other on-disk geometry fields.

Also report this condition as unsupported from online filecheck so the
checker does not try to invent a replacement tree depth for a corrupt
extent tree root.

Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>
---
No Fixes tag is included because this is a missing metadata validation
check at inode-read time, not a regression that can be cleanly tied to a
single introducing commit.
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index a510a0eb1adc..b3456e627689 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1525,6 +1525,15 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (ocfs2_dinode_has_extents(di) &&
+	    le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_list.l_tree_depth) >= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH) {
+		rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+				 "Invalid dinode %llu: extent list tree depth %u\n",
+				 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+				 le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_list.l_tree_depth));
+		goto bail;
+	}
+
 	if (le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_CHAIN_FL) {
 		struct ocfs2_chain_list *cl = &di->id2.i_chain;
 		u16 bpc = 1 << (OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_clustersize_bits -
@@ -1626,6 +1635,15 @@ static int ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 		rc = -OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_GENERATION;
 	}
 
+	if (ocfs2_dinode_has_extents(di) &&
+	    le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_list.l_tree_depth) >= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH) {
+		mlog(ML_ERROR,
+		     "Filecheck: invalid dinode #%llu: extent list tree depth %u\n",
+		     (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+		     le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_list.l_tree_depth));
+		rc = -OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+	}
+
 bail:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1633,11 +1651,14 @@ static int ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 static int ocfs2_filecheck_repair_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 					      struct buffer_head *bh)
 {
-	int changed = 0;
+	int changed = 0, rc;
 	struct ocfs2_dinode *di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)bh->b_data;
 
-	if (!ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block(sb, bh))
+	rc = ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block(sb, bh);
+	if (!rc)
 		return 0;
+	if (rc == -OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED)
+		return rc;
 
 	trace_ocfs2_filecheck_repair_inode_block(
 		(unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
-- 
2.49.0