Re: [PATCH 0/3] ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata

On Sun, 17 May 2026 07:10:11 -0400 Michael Bommarito <[email protected]> wrote:

> 
> This series adds three structural checks to
> ocfs2_validate_inode_block() that catch attacker-controlled bytes
> in a freshly read dinode before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them
> verbatim into the in-core inode.  All three checks fire on the
> mount, lookup, and read-after-cache-invalidation paths and reject
> the block with ocfs2_error(), the same error-propagation
> mechanism the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list,
> and refcount checks use.

Thanks.  Sashiko review might have found a few issues:
	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]