[PATCH v2] landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restrictions
TaheraFahimi <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.outreachy,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <ZgX5TRTrSDPrJFfF@tahera-OptiPlex-5000> |
Abstract unix sockets are used for local interprocess communication without relying on filesystem. Since landlock has no restriction for connecting to a UNIX socket in the abstract namespace, a sandboxed process can connect to a socket outside the sandboxed environment. Access to such sockets should be scoped the same way ptrace access is limited. For a landlocked process to be allowed to connect to a target process, it must have a subset of the target process’s rules (the connecting socket must be in a sub-domain of the listening socket). This patch adds a new LSM hook for connect function in unix socket with the related access rights. Link to first draft: https://lore.kernel.org/outreachy/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <[email protected]> ---- Changes in v2: - Remove wrapper functions, noted by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> --- security/landlock/task.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c index 849f5123610b..67528f87b7de 100644 --- a/security/landlock/task.c +++ b/security/landlock/task.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" @@ -108,9 +109,48 @@ static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) return task_ptrace(parent, current); } +static bool unix_sock_is_scoped(struct sock *const sock, + struct sock *const other) +{ + bool is_scoped = true; + + /* get the ruleset of connecting sock*/ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom_sock = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom_sock) + return true; + + /* get credential of listening sock*/ + const struct cred *cred_other = get_cred(other->sk_peer_cred); + + if (!cred_other) + return true; + + /* retrieve the landlock_rulesets */ + const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dom_parent = landlock_cred(cred_other)->domain; + is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_sock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return is_scoped; +} + +static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock, + struct sock *const other, + struct sock *const newsk) +{ + if (unix_sock_is_scoped(sock, other)) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, hook_unix_stream_connect), }; __init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void) -- 2.34.1