Re: [PATCH v7 1/4] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.outreachy,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 10:15:19PM -0600, Tahera Fahimi wrote: > The patch introduces a new "scoped" attribute to the > landlock_ruleset_attr that can specify "LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET" > to scope abstract unix sockets from connecting to a process outside of > the same landlock domain. > > This patch implement two hooks, "unix_stream_connect" and "unix_may_send" to > enforce this restriction. > > Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <[email protected]> > > ------- > v7: > - Using socket's file credentials for both connected(STREAM) and > non-connected(DGRAM) sockets. > - Adding "domain_sock_scope" instead of the domain scoping mechanism used in > ptrace ensures that if a server's domain is accessible from the client's > domain (where the client is more privileged than the server), the client > can connect to the server in all edge cases. > - Removing debug codes. > v6: > - Removing curr_ruleset from landlock_hierarchy, and switching back to use > the same domain scoping as ptrace. > - code clean up. > v5: > - Renaming "LANDLOCK_*_ACCESS_SCOPE" to "LANDLOCK_*_SCOPE" > - Adding curr_ruleset to hierarachy_ruleset structure to have access from > landlock_hierarchy to its respective landlock_ruleset. > - Using curr_ruleset to check if a domain is scoped while walking in the > hierarchy of domains. > - Modifying inline comments. > V4: > - Rebased on Günther's Patch: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ > so there is no need for "LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_SCOPE", then it is removed. > - Adding get_scope_accesses function to check all scoped access masks in a ruleset. > - Using file's FD credentials instead of credentials stored in peer_cred > for datagram sockets. (see discussion in [1]) > - Modifying inline comments. > V3: > - Improving commit description. > - Introducing "scoped" attribute to landlock_ruleset_attr for IPC scoping > purpose, and adding related functions. > - Changing structure of ruleset based on "scoped". > - Removing rcu lock and using unix_sk lock instead. > - Introducing scoping for datagram sockets in unix_may_send. > V2: > - Removing wrapper functions > > [1]https://lore.kernel.org/outreachy/Zmi8Ydz4Z6tYtpY1@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/T/#m8cdf33180d86c7ec22932e2eb4ef7dd4fc94c792 > ------- > > Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <[email protected]> > --- > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 29 +++++++++ > security/landlock/limits.h | 3 + > security/landlock/ruleset.c | 7 ++- > security/landlock/ruleset.h | 23 ++++++- > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 14 +++-- > security/landlock/task.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > index 68625e728f43..9cd881673434 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr { > * rule explicitly allow them. > */ > __u64 handled_access_net; > + /** > + * @scoped: Bitmask of scopes (cf. `Scope flags`_) > + * restricting a Landlock domain from accessing outside > + * resources(e.g. IPCs). > + */ > + __u64 scoped; > }; > > /* > @@ -266,4 +272,27 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr { > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) > /* clang-format on */ > + > +/** > + * DOC: scope > + * > + * .scoped attribute handles a set of restrictions on kernel IPCs through > + * the following flags. If you look at the generated documentation (once this doc is properly included), you'll see that this line ends in the Network flags section. > + * > + * Scope flags > + * ~~~~~~~~~~~ > + * > + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process from a set of IPC > + * actions. Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain > + * to forbid connections to resources outside the domain. > + * > + * IPCs with scoped actions: There is a formating issue here. > + * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process > + * from connecting to an abstract unix socket created by a process > + * outside the related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a > + * non-sandboxed process). > + */ > +/* clang-format off */ > +#define LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET (1ULL << 0) > +/* clang-format on*/ > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */