Re: AI-discovered recent CUPS vulnerabilities going through the news
Zdenek Dohnal <[email protected]> Thu, 16 Apr 2026 09:15:52 +0200
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.printing-architecture |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Till, AFAIK those vulnerabilities - CVE-2026-34980 and CVE-2026-39316 - were fixed by Mike at the time they were published, so OpenPrinting/CUPS is fixed - they are present in both master and 2.4.x branches. The only thing which remains is to do 2.4.x release, which I plan to do today. For now I updated the advisories to mention the commits which fix them. I'm sorry for the delay, I had to do CVE fix for my other components :( . Zdenek On 4/16/26 04:29, Till Kamppeter wrote: > [ Resent to correct list address, pleas only answer to this one, with > "Reply to > all". ] > > When chatting with the hosts of Destination Linux, they told me about > following posts: > > https://www.theregister.com/2026/04/06/ai_agents_cups_server_rce/ > > https://cyberpress.org/cups-vulnerability/ > > https://cybersecuritynews.com/cups-vulnerability-remote-attack/ > > https://www.scworld.com/brief/new-cups-vulnerabilities-threaten-rce-network-breaches > > > > Summary by Ryan DASgeek > ----------------------- > > ----- > > The attack doesn't require a user to "click" a link or download a > file. Instead, it exploits how Linux handles printer discovery and > print job metadata. Here is the step-by-step breakdown of how it moves > from the network to a root terminal: > > Discovery (The Hook): The attacker identifies a Linux machine with > CUPS exposed (usually on UDP port 631). They send a specially crafted > packet that "advertises" a new, fake printer on the network. Because > many Linux distributions have cups-browsed enabled by default for > convenience, the computer automatically "sees" this printer and adds > it to the system. > > The "Page-Border" Injection (The Payload): The core of the April > 2026 issue (CVE-2026-34980) lies in how CUPS parses print options. The > attacker sends a print job to this fake printer containing "smuggled" > newlines within the page-border attribute. CUPS fails to sanitize > these hidden commands. > > Command Execution: When the system processes the job, it gets > tricked into treating part of the malicious metadata as a trusted > configuration file. This allows the attacker to execute commands as > the lp (printer) user. > > Escalation to Root (The Terminal Access): Once the attacker has a > "foothold" as the lp user, they utilize a second flaw > (CVE-2026-39316), which is a Use-After-Free vulnerability in the CUPS > scheduler. By triggering a crash and memory corruption while the > system is deleting temporary printers, the attacker can escalate their > privileges from a restricted service account to full root access. At > this point, they have complete control over the terminal and the > entire operating system. > > ----- > > Michael, I did not see that, probably due to the flood of > bug/vulnerability report coming in in the last days due to several > contributors using AI. > > I hope you are aware of these (or of the fact that the combination can > lead to remote root). > > Thanks a lot, Ryan for passing this on to me. > > Till > > -- Zdenek Dohnal Senior Software Engineer Red Hat, BRQ-TPBC