Re: [PATCH] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)
Magnus Lindholm <[email protected]> Mon, 6 Jul 2026 20:00:23 +0200
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.regressions,org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.stable |
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| Message-ID | <CA+=Fv5R=mUW_p_AFFr-588F_b1hB=7RhMbtODya-gby=_fjBgg@mail.gmail.com> |
Hi Jann, > > and that is wrong because previously, the ptrace_may_access() check > relied on "error" still being "error = -EACCES" from the > initialization at the top of the function, but now it is 0 from > down_read_killable(), so now a ptrace permission check failure causes > us to return with 0 without actually having called nd_jump_link(), > which I think means we end up staying in /proc/$pid/ns? > > Sigh, I will send a fix. Thanks for looking into this. That explanation makes sense, and it matches what I was seeing from strace: /proc/<pid>/ns/pid could be opened, but the NS_* ioctls then failed with ENOTTY and strace disabled pidns translation. I'll retest the strace pidns-translation tests once your fix is available. Thanks, Magnus