Re: [syzbot ci] Re: KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.syzbot,org.kernel.vger.kvm,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Thu, Jun 11, 2026, syzbot ci wrote: > syzbot ci has tested the following series > > [v2] KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update > https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] > * [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update > > and found the following issue: > WARNING in vmx_update_cr8_intercept ... > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > debug_locks && !(lock_is_held(&(&vcpu->mutex)->dep_map) || !refcount_read(&vcpu->kvm->users_count)) > WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline], CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879 > WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879, CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879 > Modules linked in: > CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5879 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 > RIP: 0010:get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline] > RIP: 0010:vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879 > apic_update_ppr arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:984 [inline] > kvm_lapic_reset+0x1c24/0x2980 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3023 > kvm_vcpu_reset+0x44c/0x1bf0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12986 > kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x746/0x8b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12847 > kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu+0x428/0x930 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4201 > kvm_vm_ioctl+0x893/0xd50 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5159 > vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] > __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] > __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] > do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f This is "fine", the assertion just wants to make sure KVM isn't access vmcs12 without holding vcpu->mutex, otherwise any queries are inherently unstable. It's just that vCPU creation runs without taking vcpu->mutex, because the vCPU is otherwise unreachable. I'm pretty sure we can squash the WARN by grabbing vmcs12 if and only if the vCPU is actually in guest mode. diff --git arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index c548f22375ad..332fbcd924f2 100644 --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6876,11 +6876,10 @@ int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr) { - struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); int tpr_threshold; if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && - nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) + nested_cpu_has(get_vmcs12(vcpu), CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) return; guard(vmx_vmcs01)(vcpu); Longer term, I'll work on figuring out how to handle this in get_vmcs12(), because to_hv_vcpu() has the solve the same fundamental problem: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]