Re: xz meltdown/Lasse Collin

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 10:45:30AM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sun, 2024-04-14 at 12:21 +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote:
> > On 13/04/2024 15:16, James Bottomley wrote:
> > >     2. We need better build artifact transparency generally but  I
> > > think
> > >        the kernel is fine here: we still use make so don't have the
> > > huge
> > >        build artifact issue that allowed the exploit in and we have
> > > a
> > >        documented signing process for our build artifacts (kernel
> > >        tarballs).
> > >     3. The indirect library dependency problem doesn't apply to us.
> > 
> > While this is technically true, there are many other ways to
> > compromise the kernel build process:
> 
> #define injection and environmental injection have to be done on the
> build system (I mean so did the xz payload injection but it found a
> carrier in the autoconf files).  We're getting better at hermetic
> builds and other things that make direct build system tampering more
> difficult to pull off.  Hopefully, one day soon, we'll get to
> reproduceable builds that someone outside the distro will be able to
> check every distro binary ... and that would pick up almost any type of
> build system injection attack.

The kernel has worked fine for years with regard to reproducible
builds[1]. I regularly inter-build binary comparisons[2]. The main
thing needed is keeping these build variables fixed, e.g.:

KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP=1980-01-01
KBUILD_BUILD_USER=user
KBUILD_BUILD_HOST=host
KBUILD_BUILD_VERSION=1

All this said, such things would catch a malicious build host, but not
malicious build dependencies. For example, the groundwork was already
being laid[3] by "Jai Tan" to inject a build-time attack:

+eval "$($XZ --robot --version)" || exit

Any tool installed on the distro that the kernel depends on could
manipulate the build environment. We could certainly enforce better
sanity checks (i.e. sh-lint all the shell scripts), but defending
against obfuscated backdoors has always been tricky.

-Kees

[1] https://docs.kernel.org/kbuild/reproducible-builds.html
[2] https://outflux.net/blog/archives/2022/06/24/finding-binary-differences/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

-- 
Kees Cook