[tpm2] Re: Design for Secrets Encryption
Roberts, William C <william.c.roberts at intel.com> Fri, 30 Sep 2022 17:19:10 +0000
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.tpm2 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri, 2022-09-30 at 16:18 +0000, burnsds.accounts(a)protonmail.com wrote: > Thanks for the great info! In summary I think this approach will > work for me: > > Provisioning > - Generate a key using tss2_createkey No, you won't be able to get that key out of the TPM [1]. Generate a key use tss2_createseal to create the sealed object. > - Instruct TPM to unseal encrypted key using tpm_unseal > - Encrypt secrets using unsealed key and openssl > > Runtime > - At boot, instruct TPM to unseal encrypted key using tpm_unseal > - Decrypt secrets using unseal key and openssl > > I'm still working on the correct PCR register config for auth, but > I'll couple this with a time based policy to mitigate the attack you > described. Make sure you stick with FAPI API or tss2_ prefixed tools to pick up automatic paramter and response encryption with the TPM. I see you mixing tss2_ and tpm2_ tools. Just stuck with FAPI if you can. [1] Not 100% true, depends on object attributes and it can be more pain to get it back out to just then have to seal it the tpm (you always have to run tss2_createseal). > > Thanks again! > Dan > _______________________________________________ > tpm2 mailing list -- tpm2(a)lists.01.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tpm2-leave(a)lists.01.org > %(web_page_url)slistinfo%(cgiext)s/%(_internal_name)s