Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND bit and vq state
"Zhu, Lingshan" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.virtio-dev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 9/19/2023 2:41 AM, Parav Pandit wrote: >> From: Zhu, Lingshan <[email protected]> >> Sent: Monday, September 18, 2023 3:05 PM >> >> On 9/18/2023 2:54 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: >>>> From: Zhu, Lingshan <[email protected]> >>>> Sent: Monday, September 18, 2023 12:19 PM >>>> so admin vq based LM solution can be a side channel attacking surface >>> It will be part of the DSM whenever it will be used in future. >>> Hence, it is not attack surface. >> I am not sure, why we have to trust the PF? >> This is out of virtio scope anyway. >> >> I have explained many times how it can be a attack surface, and examples. >> > And none of that make any sense as fundamentally, hypervisor is trusted regardless of the approach. this is not about hypervisors, I am saying admin vq based LM solution can be a side channel attacking surface Please refer to my previously listed examples and the TDISP spec is FYI. > >> What happen if malicious SW dump guest memory by admin vq dirty page >> tracking feature? > What?? > Where is this malicious SW is located, in guest VM? host, in this attacking model. > >>>>>>>> For untrusted hypervisor, same set of attack surface is present >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> trap+emulation. >>>>>>>> So both method score same. Hence its not relevant point for discussion. >>>>>>> this is not hypervisor, Do you see any modern hypervisor have >>>>>>> these issues? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is admin vq for LM can be a side channel attacking surface. >>>>> It is not. >>>>> Hypervisor is trusted entity. >>>>> For untrusted hypervisor the TDISP is unified solution build by the >>>>> various >>>> industry bodies including DMTF, PCI for last few years. >>>>> We want to utilize that. >>>> first, TDISP is out of virtio spec. >>> Sure, hence, untrusted hypervisor are out of scope. >>> Otherwise, trap+emulation is equally dead which relies on the hypervisor to >> do things. >> so lets focus on LM topic, other than confidential computing. > ok. > >>> Just because data transfer is not done, it does not mean that thousands of >> polling register writes complete in stipulated time. >> 1) again, they are per-device facilities > That does not satisfy that it can somehow do work in < x usec time. why? Do you mind take examples of basic PCI virtio common config space registers? >> 2) we use very few registers, even status byte does not require polling, just re- >> read with delay. >> >> Please refer to the code for setting FEATURES_OK. > It wont work when one needs to suspend the device. > There is no point of doing such work over registers as fundamental framework is over the AQ. why it doesn't work? --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]