Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND bit and vq state
"Zhu, Lingshan" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.virtio-dev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 9/20/2023 7:15 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: > > Random words like malicious SW to describe an attack do not make sense. > this is not random wording, "malicious" used a lot in the papers, you can search in google scholar > > Refer the patches and series and usage model to describe the sw attack > if any. > > I disagree and I will not repeat all the points anymore. > don't only say you disagree, please provide why it is not an attacking surface. The problem still exist: What if a malicious SW dump guest memory through admin vq LM facility? I think this is end of this discussion. > > If you have comments in [1], please reply in [1]. > > Series [1] clearly describes the usage model at least for one widely > used OS = Linux. > > [1] > https://lore.kernel.org/virtio-comment/[email protected]/T/#md9fcfa1ba997463de8c7fb8c6d1786b224b0bead > > *From:* Zhu, Lingshan <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 4:41 PM > *To:* Parav Pandit <[email protected]>; Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected]; Jason Wang <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND > bit and vq state > > On 9/20/2023 5:52 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: > > Hi Lingshan, > > Last two email replies in non-next format are getting hard to follow. > > Can you please revert back to have text-based emails? > > When one wants to use PF for the live migration in trusted > hypervisor, PF is in the trust zone. > > even without live migration, it can be an attacking surface while > guest running. > As repeated for many times, it can be used by malicious SW to dump > guest memory > > In future when hypervisor is not trusted, the task of LM will be > delegated to other infrastructure TVM. > > Ravi at Intel already explained this a year ago using migration TD. > > This fits very well without bifurcating the member device which is > extremely hard. > > TD, TDX or TDX-IO are more complex topics, and we should > focus on our live migration solution, not CC. > > My point is: using bar cap as a proxy for admin vq based LM is still > problematic. > > Maybe we can close this. > > Parav > > *From:* Zhu, Lingshan <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 3:15 PM > *To:* Parav Pandit <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>; > Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected]; Jason Wang > <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce > SUSPEND bit and vq state > > On 9/20/2023 4:34 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: > > @font-face {font-family:"Cambria Math"; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 > 3 2 4;}@font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 > 4 3 2 4;}@font-face {font-family:Consolas; panose-1:2 11 6 9 2 > 2 4 3 2 4;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal > {margin:0in; font-size:11.0pt; > font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}a:link, span.MsoHyperlink > {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; > text-decoration:underline;}pre {mso-style-priority:99; > mso-style-link:"HTML Preformatted Char"; margin:0in; > margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Courier > New";}span.HTMLPreformattedChar {mso-style-name:"HTML > Preformatted Char"; mso-style-priority:99; > mso-style-link:"HTML Preformatted"; > font-family:Consolas;}span.fontstyle0 > {mso-style-name:fontstyle0;}span.EmailStyle21 > {mso-style-type:personal-reply; > font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; > color:windowtext;}.MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; > font-size:10.0pt; mso-ligatures:none;}div.WordSection1 > {page:WordSection1;} > > > There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be > hacked and compromised. > > For example: > > 1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq > > 2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking. > > > > No. hypervisor is trusted entity who is hosting the VM. > > The PF may not owned by the hypervisor and the host can be hacked > and computerized. > > > The device migration is initiated by the hypervisor. > > I am omitting the TDISP question for now as talked before. > > TDISP spec will evolve for hypercalls when we get there. > > Confidential computing is out of the spec, as we discussed and agreed. > > This is to demonstrate why even using a bar cap as proxy for admin > vq LM is still problematic. > TDISP gives examples of the attacking models, and admin vq based LM > conforms to the models. > > > *From:*[email protected] > <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]> *On Behalf Of *Zhu, > Lingshan > *Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 12:01 PM > *To:* Parav Pandit <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]>; Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected]; Jason Wang > <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce > SUSPEND bit and vq state > > On 9/20/2023 2:08 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: > > > > From: Zhu, Lingshan<[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> > > Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 11:36 AM > > > > On 9/19/2023 2:49 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 06:41:55PM +0000, Parav Pandit wrote: > > Please refer to the code for setting FEATURES_OK. > > It wont work when one needs to suspend the device. > > There is no point of doing such work over registers as fundamental > > framework is over the AQ. > > Well not really. It's over admin commands. When these were built the > > intent always was that it's possible to use admin commands through > > another interface, other than admin queue. Is there a problem > > implementing admin commands over a memory BAR? For example, I can see > > an "admin command" capability pointing at a BAR where commands are > > supplied, and using a new group type referring to device itself. > > I am not sure, if a bar cap would be implemented as a proxy for the admin vq > > based live migration. then the problems of admin vq LM that we have discussed > > still exist. the bar is only a proxy, doesn't fix anything. and even larger side > > channel attacking surface: vf-->pf-->vf > > > > AQ LM using PF has no side channel attack as hypervisor and owner device is trusted entity as already discussed. > > I believe we have discussed this for many times, and I even > provide you some examples. > > Let me repeat for the last time. > > There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be > hacked and compromised. > For example: > 1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq > 2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking. > > These above can happen right? > > You made TDISP as an example, but have you really read the > TDISP spec? > In the spec: > > Device Security Architecture - Administrative interfaces > (e.g., a PF) may be > used to influence the security properties of the TDI used by > the TVM. > > TEE-I/O requires the device to organize its hardware/software > interfaces such that the PF cannot > be used to affect the security of a TDI when it is in use by a TVM > > Clear? > > > > >