Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200
| Newsgroups | org.01.lists.linux-nvdimm,org.infradead.lists.linux-arm-kernel,org.infradead.lists.linux-riscv,org.kernel.vger.linux-api,org.kernel.vger.linux-arch,org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-kselftest,org.kvack.linux-mm |
|---|---|
| Organization | Red Hat |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote: > On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote: >> From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> >> >> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation >> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially >> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. >> >> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. > > Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on > mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common > applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to > inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers). > > Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally > inhibit hibernate? It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the admin to even work. -- Thanks, David / dhildenb _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]