Re: barebox,state on the EFI payload: boot-disk binding and state.dtb trust

Hi Raymond,

On 8/5/26 9:24 PM, Raymond | KelvaneOS wrote:
> Hello Ahmad,
> 
>> Patches are most certainly welcome, but merely adding aliases won't cut
>> it as this logic relies on both barebox and Linux using device trees
>> that unambiguously identify the boot devices.
>>
>> Do you have a scheme in mind on how to detect the boot medium in x86
>> Linux without depending on a UUID stored to the medium?
> 
> You are right; adding alias stems alone does not establish a shared
> device identity. Sorry, that suggestion was incomplete.
> 
> I was also imprecise about UUIDs: the requirement is to avoid a
> per-installation PARTUUID in the build input, not to avoid runtime GPT
> identifiers.
> 
> The patch I have in mind would resolve
> efi_loaded_image->device_handle to the corresponding whole-disk cdev,
> enumerate state-type partitions on that disk, require exactly one, and
> fix the selected partition's runtime identity into the internal DT
> exported through the EFI variable you propose below.

What's a runtime identity? The disk's UUID?

> A non-block-backed/GPT origin or a match count other than one is an
> error. The resolver would not scan other disks or select the first
> match; KelvaneOS would treat the error as fatal rather than continue
> with default state.

Fair enough.

> Linux would consume the fixed-up description and would not need to
> reconstruct the EFI device hierarchy.
> 
>> Are you going to authenticate the state via HMAC?
> 
> Yes. HMAC itself is not an x86 issue. The unresolved part is provisioning
> a protected shared secret to both barebox and the Linux writer.

Yes.

> The dt-utils provider I found is tied to CAAM/blob_gen. A key file on
> the medium would work functionally but would not meet the offline
> tampering threat model. Is a new secret-provider abstraction in
> dt-utils the preferred direction for x86?

The functionality of the out-of-tree blob_gen driver is now available
upstream in Linux as a trusted key source/backend.

It would be really nice if we had a generic method of pointing at the
blob as a DT partition and a generic dt-utils secret provider would take
that, load it as trusted key and use it for HMAC.

Use it for HMAC might be a bit tricky. We would need to either derive
some secret that can be exported to userspace or to use AF_ALG with a
key in the kernel keyring. Not sure if either is possible, but I think
something along these lines would be cool.

That said, if the kernel doesn't expose the necessary glue yet, I would
take patches that add a new secret provider.

> This is separate from trusting state.dtb: that description selects the
> backend, layout and algo, so it can redirect the state or remove HMAC
> before the state is authenticated.
>
>> We are fuzzing the DT parser because it's used for FIT images, but we
>> indeed didn't so far we treat the state layout definition as untrusted
>> input.
> 
> My concern is the valid-input case: a well-formed replacement can still
> change those semantics.

Ack

>> On device-tree enabled systems, barebox fixed it up into the kernel
>> device tree. As we only support UEFI boot on x86, we could achieve
>> something similar via volatile EFI variables with runtime access:
>>
>> barebox already sets LoaderTimeInitUSec or LoaderFirmwareInfo, so we can
>> pass the device tree similarly under the barebox GUID.
>>
>> How about:
>>
>> - barebox includes an empty device tree by default
>> - CONFIG_EXTERNAL_DTS_FRAGMENTS can be used to add the state layout
>> definition from outside the build
>> - barebox simply passes its internal DT in flattened form via the EFI
>> variable
> 
> Yes, that addresses the layout issue cleanly. I had missed
> CONFIG_EXTERNAL_DTS_FRAGMENTS as the built-in source; thanks.

It's not a built-in source per se, but the files specified there are
included after barebox' own built-in DT.

> For the Secure Boot configuration, the external ESP state.dtb must not
> remain an alternative source when a built-in state description is
> present. Would you prefer the built-in state node to suppress that path
> automatically, or a separate Kconfig guard?

built-in state should always take precedence over the external.
We can add a Kconfig option to control this later should a need arise.

> I would keep the HMAC key-provider work separate from the EFI disk
> binding and DT handoff.

Sure.

>> Are you going to use UKI profiles? If so, I could collect some thoughts
>> on how to make this more ergonomic.
> 
> We will use signed UKIs. Profiles are under evaluation; the A/B
> generations themselves will remain separate UKIs. Your thoughts would
> be very welcome.

A UKI is detected as an EFI application, so global.linux.bootargs.*
isn't serialized into load options for it.

Analogous to global.linux.bootargs.*, I think we should probably add
global.efi.bootargs.* that are concatenated (lexicographically as with
linux.bootargs) as load options.

EFI binaries that filetype_is_linux_efi_image() returns true for will
have as load options the EFI options followed by the Linux options, but
non-kernel images will just have the EFI options.

That way you can have barebox select a profile (@1/@2 at the start of
the load options).

Cheers,
Ahmad

> 
> Thanks,
> Raymond Zwarts
> 

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