Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.infradead.lists.kexec,org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-devicetree,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module,org.kvack.linux-mm |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: > On 8/11/26 16:53, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote: >> On 7/31/26 18:27, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: >>> Register a CRASH_ZEROIZE notifier that wipes secretmem folios. As a >>> result, when CONFIG_CRASH_ZEROIZE is set, secretmem areas will be >>> cleared before the kdump kernel is kexec'ed. >> >> Are you actually using secretmem in your use case? I heard some rumors that >> secretmem isn't used all that much in practice :) > > I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of > secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case. > While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as > wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional > defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users > who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read > primitives so I think everyone wins here. What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are irrelevant in practice. Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case? -- Cheers, David