Re: [PATCH 2/2] nvme: drop WARN_ON_ONCE on write_stream bounds check
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Thu, 30 Jul 2026 16:04:03 +0200
| Newsgroups | org.infradead.lists.linux-nvme,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <2026073049-improper-paparazzi-6be7@gregkh> |
On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 03:37:26PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 03:18:21PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 01:41:23PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 28, 2026 at 08:58:00AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > [... monster quote mostly dropped, please stick mail netiquette] > > > > > but a debug setup you get what you pay for, and I'm really tired of > > > > > all these totally stupid attempts to make WARN_ON the new BUG_ON. > > > > > It is not, and that's for a reason. > > > > > > > > I'm tired of it too, but again, if this can be hit by something a user > > > > does, it ends up being a DoS on the machine :( > > > > > > So let's kill parnic_on_warn? Or tain the kernel when it is set so > > > that anyone enaling it knows they have to keep the pieces when it > > > breaks? > > > > I know why the cloud-boxes want panic-on-warn enabled, as they are > > cattle and want any potential problem to just reboot the box and keep on > > going. And Samsung likes it for their billions of devices for the same > > reason (it's "safe" to reboot a phone I guess...) > > > > So as much as I would _love_ to drop it, we seem to have real users. > > Then at least add a taint to make it clear to them that they are > getting themselves into trouble instead of trying taking the only > useful debug tool away because of bad choices of a few. > syzbot has this same issue, if it ever hits a WARN() output, it stops and spits out a report. See the long thread on linux-next about this right now for a more recent discussion about this. As for a taint, I'm not sure what you are asking here. If panic-on-warn is not enabled, wonderful, a WARN() will spit out a great debugging message and everyone moves on just fine. It's only the systems that have panic-on-warn enabled that need to worry about user-triggered calls to that macro, and those systems know what they are getting themselves into, including the huge number of CVE fixes they then need to be responsible for backporting :) thanks, greg k-h