[MODERATED] Re: [patch V4 04/11] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffer()

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:24:22PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> +MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
> +L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
> +to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
> +operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
> +deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
> +can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
> +be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
> +Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
> +
> +MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations

MLPDS

> +from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
> +file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
> +contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
> +faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
> +exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
> +thread leakage is possible.
> +
> +
> +Exposure assumptions
> +--------------------
> +
> +It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
> +exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
> +needed for exploiting MDS requires:
> +
> + - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
> +
> + - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
> +   data for consumption through a side channel.
> +
> + - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
> +   data
> +
> +The existence of such a construct cannot be excluded with 100% certainty,
> +but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.

The existence of such a construct *in the kernel* cannot be excluded...

> +There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
> +untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
> +whether it can be used to create such a construct.
> +
> +
> +Mitigation strategy
> +-------------------
> +
> +All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
> +thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
> +
> +This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
> +instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
> +the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
> +
> +For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
> +clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
> +command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
> +VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
> +be issued.
> +
> +If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
> +executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
> +other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
> +
> +This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
> +which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
> +enters a C-state.
> +
> +The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
> +
> +    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
> +
> +The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
> +(idle) transitions. Depending on the mitigation mode and the system state
> +the invocation can be enforced or conditional.

The conditional bit isn't true (yet?).

What does "enforced" mean in this context?  s/enforced/unconditional ?
Maybe the last sentence can be removed entirely.

-- 
Josh