Re: [patch V6 05/14] MDS basics 5
Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Thu, 7 Mar 2019, speck for Andi Kleen wrote: > On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 10:47:43PM +0100, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> > > Subject: [patch V6 05/14] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests > > > > X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode > > provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers > > by invoking the VERW instruction. > > > > Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations. > > > > This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available > > separately. > > This patch is not complete. You also need some variant of > > x86/speculation/mds: Handle VMENTRY clear for CPUs without l1tf 650b68a0622f ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active") Thanks, tglx