[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
Jon Masters <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 3/3/19 8:23 PM, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index e11654f93e71..0c71ab0d57e3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
>
> /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
> static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> +static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
>
> static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
> [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
> @@ -238,8 +239,13 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
> if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
> mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
> +
> static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
> +
> + if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> + cpu_smt_disable(false);
Is there some logic missing here to disable SMT?
Jon.
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(text/rfc822-headers, 117 B)
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]> To: speck for Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1