[MODERATED] Re: Encrypted Message

Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Newsgroups org.kernel.lore.historical-speck
Message-ID <20190304170603.mx4rwst72yhv2y7m@treble>
On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 10:55:47PM -0500, speck for Jon Masters wrote:

> On 3/3/19 8:23 PM, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index e11654f93e71..0c71ab0d57e3 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
> >  
> >  /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
> >  static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> > +static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
> >  
> >  static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
> >  	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
> > @@ -238,8 +239,13 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
> >  	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
> >  		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
> >  			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
> > +
> >  		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
> > +
> > +		if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
> > +			cpu_smt_disable(false);
> 
> Is there some logic missing here to disable SMT?

That would be the cpu_smt_disable() call :-)

-- 
Josh
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