[MODERATED] Re: Re: [PATCH v7 04/10] TAAv7 4
Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 10:44:52AM -0700, speck for Pawan Gupta wrote:
> There is a small problem with this, it will set
>
> taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE;
>
> when there is no X86_BUG_TAA.
And?
When the CPU doesn't support TSX, then this practically is "Mitigation:
TSX disabled" because, well, TSX *is* disabled.
Also, from all the possible settings:
[TAA_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
[TAA_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
[TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE is the one that fits best for the !RTM case,
no?
> goto will cause it to differ from other mitigations that don't print
> individual mitigation status when mitigations are turned off globally
> (when cpu_mitigations_off() is true).
Well, I'd prefer to have a confirmation in dmesg that mitigations were
off but we have that in sysfs already. And the other mitigations don't
print anything, as you say, so yeah, I guess let's not fall out of line
here.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
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