[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v7 00/10] TAAv7 0
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20191023171109.v2zuencuodj3fvku@treble> |
On Wed, Oct 23, 2019 at 05:46:04PM +0200, speck for Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 01:22:01PM -0700, speck for Pawan Gupta wrote: > > From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> > > Subject: [PATCH v7 00/10] TAAv7 > > Ok, I ran the pile on a box here: > > vendor_id : GenuineIntel > cpu family : 6 > model : 158 > model name : Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-9600K CPU @ 3.70GHz > stepping : 12 > > There is some microcode for it: > > [ 0.000000] microcode: microcode updated early to revision 0xc6, date = 2019-08-14 > [ 1.005808] microcode: sig=0x906ec, pf=0x2, revision=0xc6 > > And booting it says: > > [ 0.197056] tsx_init: enter > [ 0.197207] tsx_ctrl_is_supported: CAP MSR: 0x9 > > This is added by me and it shows that the box is a pre MDS_NO=1 one, > i.e., MD_CLEAR mitigates TAA too AFAIU. > > Which means, there's no TSX_CTRL_MSR and I cannot disable TSX there. > > Which means, boxes like this one don't need the microcode as long as > they have MD_CLEAR microcode. > > [ 0.197363] Spectre V1 : Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization > [ 0.197540] Spectre V2 : Mitigation: Full generic retpoline > [ 0.197696] Spectre V2 : Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch > [ 0.197871] Spectre V2 : Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls > [ 0.198032] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier > [ 0.198208] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp > [ 0.198386] MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers > [ 0.198540] TAA: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers > > Makes sense? FWIW, makes sense to me. It will be especially interesting to see tests on an MDS_NO=1 box with the new microcode. -- Josh