[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v7 04/10] TAAv7 4

On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 02:29:02PM -0700, speck for Pawan Gupta wrote:
> Side effect of RTM check ahead of X86_BUG_TAA will be a dmesg print
> "Mitigation: TSX disabled" when X86_BUG_TAA is not set.

So what you're trying to tell me is that you don't want to print that
message at all?

	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE;
		return;
	}

How's that?

> > Also, from all the possible settings:
> > 
> >         [TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]            = "Vulnerable",
> >         [TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]   = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
> >         [TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]           = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
> >         [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE]    = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
> > 
> > TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE is the one that fits best for the !RTM case,
> > no?
> 
> When X86_BUG_TAA is not set sysfs shows "Not affected" irrespective of
> value of taa_mitigation.
> 
> 	cpu_show_common()
> 	{
> 		if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
> 			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> 		[...]

Sorry, I can't follow what you're trying to tell me here.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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