[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v5 08/11] TAAv5 8
"Luck, Tony" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 07:05:33AM +0200, speck for Jiri Kosina wrote: > But again, given Pawan's (surprising to me, I'd still like to find this > detail documented somewhere in Intel's materials) statement that there > will never be a situation when some older CPU with MDS_NO will see > ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR exposed by new ucode, I see this as much less > pressing issue, and we could get away with tsx=off, as the number > immediate regressions will be minimal. > Here's a rough timeline. "Old" CPUs = everything vulnerable to MDS before: Cascade Lake (model 0x55, stepping 0x6, 0x7), Whiskey Lake (model 0x8E, stepping 0xC), Coffee Lake refresh (model 0x9E, stepping 0xD) These don't set MDS_NO. They already have (since May 14) a microcode update to enable MD_CLEAR (VERW + enhanced L1D flush). They are vulnerable to TAA, but the existing MDS fixes also mitigate TAA. They are not going to get a u-code update for TAA. They will not have TSX_CTRL. "Current" CPUs (Cascade Lake, Whiskey Lake, Coffee Lake refresh). Out of the box these have MDS_NO=1. They set the CPUID MD_CLEAR bit (even though VERW doesn't flush the store buffers, fill buffers & load ports. Blame the VMM folks for talking us into doing that). There is (Embargo: Nov 12) a microcode update for these CPUS that: 1) Enables the VERW/L1D flush of fill buffers, store buffers, load ports 2) Provides the TSX_CTRL MSR OS can choose whether to mitigate TAA by either turning off TSX, or by using VERW. [Note that because MD_CLEAR isn't a useful indicator here OS can use the existence of TSX_CTRL to determine whether VERW is effective] "Future" CPUs These will set TAA_NO in additon to MDS_NO. Intel has said that we will continue to support TSX_CTRL. -Tony