[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/9] TAA 3
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20191024164323.wcn54g3iiffjoiiq@treble> |
On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 06:33:36PM +0200, speck for Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 10:30:15AM -0500, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > > This still needs details about when 'tsx=off' does and doesn't work. > > > > The above makes it sound like it's off for all CPUs, when in fact it's > > only off for newer MDS_NO CPUs. > > How does that sound (and that is being mentioned somewhere in all the > text but here it is important to have): > > off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this > option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are > not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have > MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get > the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode > update. This new MSR allows for the reliable > deactivation of the TSX functionality.) > > > It should also perhaps describe the risks associated with tsx=on. While > > there are mitigations for all known issues (i.e., the tsx_async_abort= > > option), TSX has been known to be an accelerator for several previous > > speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be unknown security risks > > associated with leaving it enabled. > > You've basically said it nicely already: > > "Although there are mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities, > TSX has been known to be an accelerator for several previous > speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be unknown security risks > associated with leaving it enabled." > > ACK? ACK -- Josh