[MODERATED] Re: LVI
Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Tue, 19 Nov 2019 12:27:52 -0600
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20191119182752.xh5e6x733nnhjwo5@treble> |
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 05:51:40PM +0000, speck for Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 19/11/2019 17:40, speck for Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > > Hi, > > > > What kernel changes (if any) are needed for LVI? I haven't seen any > > discussion here. > > I have similar questions when it comes to virt. For one, EPT A/D bits > undermine any action the guest kernel takes to protect itself. > > Given various pieces of academic literature on gaming the paging-out > algorithm, I'm not inclined to take the bet that an attacker couldn't > control EPT A/D bits to their advantage. Hm, so IIUC, that would open up every load in the guest to a potential attack, if it has gadgets after it? That does sound bad... If the A/D bit control is feasible then it sounds like we'd need an L1TF-like flushing mitigation after vmexit? That would protect the host kernel too. For L1TF-affected systems would it be feasible to move the vmenter flushing to vmexit? Or would we need both? -- Josh