Re: [PATCH v2] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()
Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> Wed, 1 Jul 2026 10:54:59 -0300
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.audit,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAABTaaAXJRSws12G6ZF0YYvqMt6eK0WyxtRrC2mr4WkieQd0vw@mail.gmail.com> |
On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 4:46=E2=80=AFPM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wr= ote: > > On Jun 1, 2026 Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This > > has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is > > large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len > > (declared as int) from the size_t calculation. > > > > Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and > > changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation. > > > > Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings") > > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> > > Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> > > --- > > Changes in v2: > > - Use check_shl_overflow() instead of manual overflow check. > > > > kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > index e1d489bc2dff..8ca268610641 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ > > #include <net/ip.h> > > #include <net/ipv6.h> > > #include <linux/sctp.h> > > +#include <linux/overflow.h> > > > > #include "audit.h" > > > > @@ -2076,7 +2077,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, co= nst char *fmt, ...) > > void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf= , > > size_t len) > > { > > - int i, avail, new_len; > > + int avail; > > + size_t i, new_len; > > unsigned char *ptr; > > struct sk_buff *skb; > > > > @@ -2084,9 +2086,13 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, co= nst unsigned char *buf, > > return; > > > > BUG_ON(!ab->skb); > > + > > skb =3D ab->skb; > > avail =3D skb_tailroom(skb); > > - new_len =3D len<<1; > > + > > + if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) > > + return; > > By returning without logging a value I worry we could end up with an > oddly formatted audit record, e.g. "... A=3Dfoo B=3D C=3Dbar ...". Inste= ad of > simply returning, should we log a '?' for the value and then return? > It makes sense, Paul. I'll send a new version shortly. > > if (new_len >=3D avail) { > > /* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ > > new_len =3D AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) = + 1); > > -- > > 2.53.0 > > -- > paul-moore.com >