Re: [PATCH] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_string()
Paul Moore <[email protected]> Fri, 17 Jul 2026 17:44:01 -0400
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.audit,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Jul 14, 2026 Zhan Xusheng <[email protected]> wrote: > > audit_log_n_string() computes new_len as "slen + 3" (enclosing quotes > plus the NUL terminator) and stores it into an int, while slen is a > size_t. For a sufficiently large slen the addition can overflow and/or > the result be truncated when assigned to the int new_len, so the > "new_len > avail" check can be bypassed and the subsequent > memcpy(ptr, string, slen) can write past the skb tail. > > This is the same class of bug that was fixed for the hex sibling in > commit 65dfde57d1e2 ("audit: fix potential integer overflow in > audit_log_n_hex()"); both helpers are reached through > audit_log_n_untrustedstring() with the same length source. > > Make new_len a size_t and use check_add_overflow() to catch the > overflow, mirroring the audit_log_n_hex() fix. No functional change for > the in-tree callers, which all pass bounded lengths. > > Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings") > Cc: [email protected] > Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <[email protected]> > --- > kernel/audit.c | 11 +++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 562476937fa7..547ae0cebec9 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -2120,7 +2120,8 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, > void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, > size_t slen) > { > - int avail, new_len; > + int avail; > + size_t new_len; > unsigned char *ptr; > struct sk_buff *skb; > > @@ -2130,7 +2131,13 @@ void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, > BUG_ON(!ab->skb); > skb = ab->skb; > avail = skb_tailroom(skb); > - new_len = slen + 3; /* enclosing quotes + null terminator */ > + > + /* enclosing quotes + null terminator */ > + if (check_add_overflow(slen, (size_t)3, &new_len)) { You shouldn't need the size_t cast for the '3' constant. > + audit_log_format(ab, "\"?\""); There is no need for the additional quotes, see the related audit_log_n_hex() fix you mentioned in the commit description: audit_log_format(ab, "?"); > + return; > + } > + > if (new_len > avail) { > avail = audit_expand(ab, new_len); > if (!avail) > -- > 2.43.0 -- paul-moore.com