Re: [PATCH] audit: add CLONE3 auxiliary record to log process cloning
Steve Grubb <[email protected]> Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:01:21 -0400
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.audit,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kvack.linux-mm |
|---|---|
| Organization | Red Hat |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tuesday, July 28, 2026 12:31:02=E2=80=AFPM Eastern Daylight Time Richard= Guy=20 Briggs wrote: > On 2026-07-24 12:02, Ricardo Robaina wrote: > > The clone3(2) syscall moves most parameters to struct clone_args. > > For this reason, the generic SYSCALL audit record does not capture > > the structured arguments. > >=20 > > Add a CLONE3 auxiliary record that logs: flags, exit_signal, cgroup, > > and pidfd fields from struct clone_args. When CLONE_PIDFD is set and > > the syscall succeeds, the resolved pidfd is logged; otherwise > > pidfd=3D(null). > >=20 > > ---- > > type=3DSYSCALL : syscall=3Dclone3 a0=3D0x7ffe7f1ec640 a1=3D0x58 a2=3D0= x0 ... > > type=3DCLONE3 : cl3_flags=3D0x1000 exit_signal=3D17 cgroup=3D0 pidfd= =3D3 > >=20 > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/151 > > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> > > --- > >=20 > > include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++++++ > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > kernel/auditsc.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/fork.c | 4 +++- > > 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > >=20 > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > index 45abb3722d30..833f349bf415 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > @@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 > > offset);>=20 > > extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad); > > extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int > > nentries,> =20 > > =09=09=09 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp); > >=20 > > +extern void __audit_log_clone3(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs, int > > ret); > >=20 > > static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) > > { > >=20 > > @@ -598,6 +599,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_nfcfg(const char *nam= e, > > u8 af,>=20 > > =09=09__audit_log_nfcfg(name, af, nentries, op, gfp); > > =20 > > } > >=20 > > +static inline void audit_log_clone3(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs, i= nt > > ret) +{ > > +=09if (!audit_dummy_context()) > > +=09=09__audit_log_clone3(kargs, ret); > > +} > > + > >=20 > > extern int audit_n_rules; > > extern int audit_signals; > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > >=20 > > @@ -730,6 +737,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name= , > > u8 af,>=20 > > =09=09=09=09 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp) > > =20 > > { } > >=20 > > +static inline void audit_log_clone3(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs, i= nt > > ret) +{ } > > + > >=20 > > #define audit_n_rules 0 > > #define audit_signals 0 > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > >=20 > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > index e8f5ce677df7..37357e17adbf 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ > >=20 > > #define AUDIT_OPENAT2=09=091337=09/* Record showing openat2 how args= =20 */ > > #define AUDIT_DM_CTRL=09=091338=09/* Device Mapper target control */ > > #define AUDIT_DM_EVENT=09=091339=09/* Device Mapper events */ > >=20 > > +#define AUDIT_CLONE3=09=091343=09/* Record showing clone3 args */ > >=20 > > #define AUDIT_AVC=09=091400=09/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ > > #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR=091401=09/* Internal SE Linux Errors */ > >=20 > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index 6610e667c728..c0106bb71c19 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -2882,6 +2882,26 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, > > unsigned int nentries,>=20 > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg); > >=20 > > +void __audit_log_clone3(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs, int ret) > > +{ > > +=09struct audit_buffer *ab; > > +=09int pidfd; > > + > > +=09ab =3D audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, > > +=09=09=09 AUDIT_CLONE3); > > +=09if (!ab) > > +=09=09return; > > + > > +=09audit_log_format(ab, "cl3_flags=3D0x%llx exit_signal=3D%d cgroup=3D= %d", > > +=09=09=09 kargs->flags, kargs->exit_signal, kargs->cgroup); >=20 > Would there be any confusion if this were simply "flags=3D..." since it i= s > already a record type AUDIT_CLONE3? flags is already used in mmap records and will require workarounds to have= =20 the same field name here. Separating them by name is better. > > +=09if ((kargs->flags & CLONE_PIDFD) && ret >=3D 0 && > > +=09 !get_user(pidfd, kargs->pidfd)) > > +=09=09audit_log_format(ab, " pidfd=3D%d", pidfd); > > +=09else > > +=09=09audit_log_format(ab, " pidfd=3D(null)"); >=20 > Is there any interest in: > =09child_tid (was captured by generic audit syscall arg 4) > =09parent_tid (was captured by generic audit syscall arg 3 or 4) > =09tls (was captured by generic audit syscall arg 4) > =09set_tid Nope. Those are more resource related and not security focused. Even if you= =20 wanted it, these are pointers to the answer and not the answer. The patch h= as=20 everything needed from a security PoV. Ack. > Is there a situation where a valid pid is returned without CLONE_PIDFD se= t? No idea. The man page makes it sound like it is only valid when CLONE_PIDFD= .=20 Besides, its a pointer to an int from what the man page said. -Steve > Otherwise, looks reasonable to me. >=20 > > +=09audit_log_end(ab); > > +} > > + > >=20 > > static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) > > { > > =20 > > =09kuid_t auid, uid; > >=20 > > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c > > index f0e2e131a9a5..0f52e8c0e900 100644 > > --- a/kernel/fork.c > > +++ b/kernel/fork.c > > @@ -3047,7 +3047,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user = *, > > uargs, size_t, size)>=20 > > =09if (!clone3_args_valid(&kargs)) > > =09 > > =09=09return -EINVAL; > >=20 > > -=09return kernel_clone(&kargs); > > +=09err =3D kernel_clone(&kargs); > > +=09audit_log_clone3(&kargs, err); > > +=09return err; > >=20 > > } > > =20 > > void walk_process_tree(struct task_struct *top, proc_visitor visitor, > > void *data) > - RGB >=20 > -- > Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > Upstream IRC: SunRaycer > Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570