Re: [PATCH 1/1] bpf: Check sk_fullsock() in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Tue, 4 Aug 2026 03:00:49 +0000
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.bpf,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Ren Wei <[email protected]> Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 21:59:39 +0800 > From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> > > bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie accept a socket pointer > 'sk' with argument type ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON. However, they access > sk->sk_protocol without validating whether 'sk' represents a full socket. > > When a BPF program passes a mini-socket (such as struct request_sock or > struct inet_timewait_sock obtained via bpf_skc_lookup_tcp), sk_protocol > is located beyond the memory boundary allocated for mini-sockets. > Directly dereferencing sk->sk_protocol leads to a slab-out-of-bounds > kernel read. > > Fix this issue by adding a sk_fullsock(sk) check at the start of both > bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie before inspecting > fullsock-specific fields. > > Fixes: c0df236e1394 ("bpf: Change bpf_tcp_*_syncookie to accept ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON") > Cc: [email protected] > Reported-by: Vega <[email protected]> > Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 > Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> > --- > net/core/filter.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c > index b446aa8be5c3..afdcfdf41489 100644 > --- a/net/core/filter.c > +++ b/net/core/filter.c > @@ -7678,6 +7678,9 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len > if (unlikely(!sk || th_len < sizeof(*th))) > return -EINVAL; > > + if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > /* sk_listener() allows TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, which makes no sense here. */ > if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) Simply swap the order of these, TCP_LISTEN implies full sock. > return -EINVAL; > @@ -7752,6 +7755,9 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len, > if (unlikely(!sk || th_len < sizeof(*th) || th_len != th->doff * 4)) > return -EINVAL; > > + if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) > return -EINVAL; > > -- > 2.43.0