[PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Merge pointer types also when both are PTR_TO_MEM

save_aux_ptr_type() only reaches the merge when reg_type_mismatch() says
the two types are incompatible, and that in turn requires at least one of
them to have a base type reg_type_mismatch_ok() rejects. PTR_TO_MEM is
not among those, so for two PTR_TO_MEM based types the merge never runs
and the recorded type stays the one of whichever path was verified first.

That is ok as long as all PTR_TO_MEM variants can be dereferenced with
a plain load, which stopped being true with commit f2362a57aeff ("bpf:
allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()") adding PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY
| PTR_UNTRUSTED. If the other path saved e.g. a PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF
first, then bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite the load into a
BPF_PROBE_MEM one, and the untrusted path faults on a plain load.

Fix by merging the two whenever they differ and both are of PTR_TO_MEM or
PTR_TO_BTF_ID base instead of keying it off reg_type_mismatch(), so that
merge_ptr_types() gets to normalize the result in this case as well. The
rejection of genuinely incompatible types is left untouched.

Fixes: f2362a57aeff ("bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 0d3b76d7820e..8ef9418733ca 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -17050,6 +17050,17 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ
 		 * save type to validate intersecting paths
 		 */
 		*prev_type = type;
+	} else if (*prev_type != type && allow_trust_mismatch &&
+		   is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) &&
+		   is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) {
+		/*
+		 * Have to support a use case when one path through the
+		 * program yields a TRUSTED pointer while another is
+		 * UNTRUSTED. Merge them into a type which keeps the
+		 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX rewrite when either
+		 * side needs it.
+		 */
+		*prev_type = merge_ptr_types(type, *prev_type);
 	} else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) {
 		/* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn
 		 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
@@ -17058,21 +17069,8 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ
 		 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
 		 * Reject it.
 		 */
-		if (allow_trust_mismatch &&
-		    is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) &&
-		    is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) {
-			/*
-			 * Have to support a use case when one path through
-			 * the program yields a TRUSTED pointer while another
-			 * is UNTRUSTED. Merge them into a type which keeps
-			 * the BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX rewrite when
-			 * either side needs it.
-			 */
-			*prev_type = merge_ptr_types(type, *prev_type);
-		} else {
-			verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+		verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.43.0