Re: [PATCH bpf v2] bpf: guard uprobes against private-stack corruption
Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.bpf,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <aooIR-oRaN4iIQRy@krava> |
On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 11:06:16AM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote: > On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 1:33 PM Christian Simon <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Eligible BPF programs use one private stack per program and CPU. Both > > bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe() and uprobe_prog_run() use migrate_disable() > > to keep an invocation on one CPU, but another task can still preempt it > > and run the same program on that CPU. The second invocation then reuses > > and can overwrite the first invocation's private stack. > > > > Protect each real program invocation with the existing per-program > > recursion context. When the program is already active on this CPU, > > account for the missed invocation and skip it. Return zero when skipping > > an uprobe-multi invocation so session handling does not suppress its > > return probe. > > > > Skip dummy_bpf_prog in the classic array path before acquiring the > > recursion context because its active pointer is NULL. > > > > Add a regression test that pins two threads to one CPU and overlaps > > classic and multi uprobe invocations while preserving a sentinel in a > > private stack frame. Without the guards, the second invocation executes > > and corrupts the first invocation's sentinel. > > > > Fixes: 7d1cd70d4b16 ("bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit") > > Fixes: 6c17a882d380 ("bpf, arm64: JIT support for private stack") > > Closes: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/issues/3056 > > Cc: [email protected] > > Signed-off-by: Christian Simon <[email protected]> > > --- > > Changes in v2: > > - Address review comments from sashiko-bot > > - Guard the uprobe-multi path as well. > > - Remove const from correct line > > - Add a regression selftest for uprobe-classic/multi paths. > > - Add the arm64 Fixes tag. > > > > include/linux/bpf.h | 33 +++-- > > kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 +- > > .../bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_private_stack.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++ > > .../bpf/progs/uprobe_private_stack.c | 54 ++++++++ > > 4 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_private_stack.c > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_private_stack.c > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h > > index 7719f6528445..a94fc9898ece 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h > > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h > > @@ -2572,6 +2572,14 @@ static inline void bpf_reset_run_ctx(struct bpf_run_ctx *old_ctx) > > > > typedef u32 (*bpf_prog_run_fn)(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const void *ctx); > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL > > +void notrace bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog); > > +#else > > +static inline void bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog) > > +{ > > +} > > +#endif > > + > > static __always_inline u32 > > bpf_prog_run_array(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > > const void *ctx, bpf_prog_run_fn run_prog) > > @@ -2617,7 +2625,7 @@ bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > > const void *ctx, bpf_prog_run_fn run_prog) > > { > > const struct bpf_prog_array_item *item; > > - const struct bpf_prog *prog; > > + struct bpf_prog *prog; > > struct bpf_run_ctx *old_run_ctx; > > struct bpf_trace_run_ctx run_ctx; > > u32 ret = 1; > > @@ -2635,15 +2643,30 @@ bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > > old_run_ctx = bpf_set_run_ctx(&run_ctx.run_ctx); > > item = &array->items[0]; > > while ((prog = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) { > > + /* dummy_bpf_prog has no recursion state. */ > > + if (unlikely(!prog->len)) { > > + item++; > > + continue; > > + } > > + > > + if (unlikely(!bpf_prog_get_recursion_context(prog))) { > > + bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(prog); > > + bpf_prog_put_recursion_context(prog); > > + item++; > > + continue; > > + } > > + > > I think it's unacceptable to skip sleepable uprobe execution just > because there is the same BPF program attached to a *different* uprobe > (and all due to a private stack that no one asked for or needs for > uprobes, really). > > As a short-term fix, we should probably disable private stack for > sleepable uprobe/kprobe program (and tracepoint/raw_tracepoint), and > think how we can make private stack less per-CPU dependent. +1 for disabling private stack for uprobes thanks, jirka