Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] ceph: cap delegated inode count in ceph_parse_deleg_inos()

On Sat, 2026-06-06 at 15:00 -0400, Michael Bommarito wrote:
> ceph_parse_deleg_inos() decodes interval sets of delegated inode
> numbers
> from an MDS create-with-delegation reply. For each set it reads a 64-
> bit
> start and a 64-bit len with ceph_decode_64_safe(), which only
> validates
> that the eight bytes are present in the message, not the value, and
> then
> loops over len while inserting entries into s_delegated_inos.
> 
> len is fully attacker controlled. A malicious or compromised MDS can
> send
> one huge interval, many intervals in one reply, duplicate intervals,
> or
> repeated replies that accumulate delegated inodes on the same
> session.
> The v1 fix bounded only one interval and still allowed aggregate CPU
> and
> memory pressure.
> 
> Bound both dimensions. Track the number of delegated inodes currently
> held by each MDS session, reject replies that would exceed that
> population cap, and also cap the total interval length accepted from
> one
> reply so duplicate ranges cannot spin through an attacker-controlled
> len
> while making no successful xarray inserts. The counter is decremented
> when async create consumes a delegated inode, incremented when a
> delegated inode is restored, initialized with the session xarray, and
> reset when reconnect destroys the xarray contents.
> 
> The cap is a fixed, client-chosen constant rather than a value
> derived
> from the MDS. mds_client_prealloc_inos is a userspace MDS
> configuration
> option; it is never sent to the kernel client on the wire, and a
> server-supplied bound could not be trusted for a defensive limit in
> any
> case. The constant is set well above that option's documented default
> of
> 1000 (a generous multiple), so legitimate refill behavior is
> unaffected
> while the CPU and xarray memory a malformed delegation stream can
> consume
> stays bounded.
> 
> Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph MDS can no longer make a
> client
> spin through an unbounded delegated-inode interval or grow one
> session's
> delegated-inode xarray without limit.
> 
> Fixes: d48464878708 ("ceph: decode interval_sets for delegated inos")
> Cc: [email protected]
> Suggested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
> Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
> ---
> v2:
> - Replace the per-interval cap with a per-session delegated-inode
>   population counter.
> - Add a per-reply interval budget so duplicate ranges cannot run the
>   insertion loop without increasing the population counter.
> - Reset the counter when reconnect destroys the delegated-inode
> xarray.
> - Document why the cap is a fixed client-side constant (the kernel
> client
>   cannot read the userspace mds_client_prealloc_inos option).
> 
>  fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> --
>  fs/ceph/mds_client.h |  1 +
>  fs/ceph/super.h      |  9 ++++++++
>  3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> index 4f36ac73305dc..ec5a80c9f86a7 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> @@ -612,16 +612,34 @@ static int parse_reply_info_filelock(void **p,
> void *end,
>  
>  #define DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE		xa_mk_value(1)
>  
> +static int ceph_insert_deleg_ino(struct ceph_mds_session *s, u64
> ino)

static inline?

> +{
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (atomic_inc_return(&s->s_num_deleg_inos) >
> CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS) {
> +		atomic_dec(&s->s_num_deleg_inos);

The atomic_add_unless() sounds like a better way to manage this. What
do you think?

> +		return -EOVERFLOW;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = xa_insert(&s->s_delegated_inos, ino,
> DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE,
> +			GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (err)
> +		atomic_dec(&s->s_num_deleg_inos);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
>  static int ceph_parse_deleg_inos(void **p, void *end,
>  				 struct ceph_mds_session *s)
>  {
>  	struct ceph_client *cl = s->s_mdsc->fsc->client;
> +	u64 msg_deleg_inos = 0;
>  	u32 sets;
>  
>  	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, sets, bad);
>  	doutc(cl, "got %u sets of delegated inodes\n", sets);
>  	while (sets--) {
>  		u64 start, len;
> +		int session_deleg_inos;
>  
>  		ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, start, bad);
>  		ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, len, bad);
> @@ -633,16 +651,34 @@ static int ceph_parse_deleg_inos(void **p, void
> *end,
>  				start, len);
>  			continue;
>  		}
> +
> +		if (len > CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS ||
> +		    msg_deleg_inos > CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS - len) {

The len is u64. Should we use the cast (u64) for CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS in
comparison and calculation?

> +			pr_warn_ratelimited_client(cl, "too many
> delegated inodes in reply\n");

Should we show the number of delegated inodes in output?

> +			return -EIO;
> +		}
> +
> +		session_deleg_inos = atomic_read(&s-
> >s_num_deleg_inos);

Is it possible that s_num_deleg_inos could be bigger than
CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS? Because, ceph_insert_deleg_ino() should not
increment it bigger than CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS.

> +		if (session_deleg_inos > CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS ||
> +		    len > CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS - session_deleg_inos)
> {
> +			pr_warn_ratelimited_client(cl, "too many
> delegated inodes for session\n");
> +			return -EIO;
> +		}

I assume that it is enough to have the check for msg_deleg_inos. Am I
wrong here?

> +
> +		msg_deleg_inos += len;
> +
>  		while (len--) {
> -			int err = xa_insert(&s->s_delegated_inos,
> start++,
> -					    DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE,
> -					    GFP_KERNEL);
> +			int err = ceph_insert_deleg_ino(s, start++);
> +
>  			if (!err) {
>  				doutc(cl, "added delegated inode
> 0x%llx\n", start - 1);

Maybe, do we need to keep previous value in variable?

>  			} else if (err == -EBUSY) {
>  				pr_warn_client(cl,
>  					"MDS delegated inode 0x%llx
> more than once.\n",
>  					start - 1);
> +			} else if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
> +				pr_warn_ratelimited_client(cl, "too
> many delegated inodes\n");

I assume that we already have error message from
ceph_insert_deleg_ino(). Do we need in this error message here?

Thanks,
Slava.

> +				return -EIO;
>  			} else {
>  				return err;
>  			}
> @@ -660,16 +696,17 @@ u64 ceph_get_deleg_ino(struct ceph_mds_session
> *s)
>  
>  	xa_for_each(&s->s_delegated_inos, ino, val) {
>  		val = xa_erase(&s->s_delegated_inos, ino);
> -		if (val == DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE)
> +		if (val == DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE) {
> +			atomic_dec(&s->s_num_deleg_inos);
>  			return ino;
> +		}
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  int ceph_restore_deleg_ino(struct ceph_mds_session *s, u64 ino)
>  {
> -	return xa_insert(&s->s_delegated_inos, ino,
> DELEGATED_INO_AVAILABLE,
> -			 GFP_KERNEL);
> +	return ceph_insert_deleg_ino(s, ino);
>  }
>  #else /* BITS_PER_LONG == 64 */
>  /*
> @@ -1056,6 +1093,7 @@ static struct ceph_mds_session
> *register_session(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_waiting);
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_unsafe);
>  	xa_init(&s->s_delegated_inos);
> +	atomic_set(&s->s_num_deleg_inos, 0);
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_cap_releases);
>  	INIT_WORK(&s->s_cap_release_work, ceph_cap_release_work);
>  
> @@ -4971,6 +5009,7 @@ static void send_mds_reconnect(struct
> ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
>  		goto fail_nomsg;
>  
>  	xa_destroy(&session->s_delegated_inos);
> +	atomic_set(&session->s_num_deleg_inos, 0);
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex);
>  	session->s_state = CEPH_MDS_SESSION_RECONNECTING;
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> index 4e6c87f8414cc..3810b51ece2e6 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_session {
>  	struct list_head  s_waiting;  /* waiting requests */
>  	struct list_head  s_unsafe;   /* unsafe requests */
>  	struct xarray	  s_delegated_inos;
> +	atomic_t	  s_num_deleg_inos;
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h
> index afc89ce91804e..bfc26e4d83bb4 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/super.h
> +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h
> @@ -634,6 +634,15 @@ static inline int ceph_ino_compare(struct inode
> *inode, void *data)
>  #define CEPH_MDS_INO_LOG_OFFSET		(2 * CEPH_MAX_MDS)
>  #define CEPH_INO_SYSTEM_BASE		((6*CEPH_MAX_MDS) +
> (CEPH_MAX_MDS * CEPH_NUM_STRAY))
>  
> +/*
> + * Upper bound on the number of delegated inodes a single MDS
> session may
> + * hold. The MDS normally hands out a small preallocation window
> (the
> + * userspace mds_client_prealloc_inos option defaults to 1000) and
> refills
> + * it as the client consumes entries. This leaves generous headroom
> while
> + * bounding the CPU and memory a malformed delegation interval can
> consume.
> + */
> +#define CEPH_MAX_DELEG_INOS		8192
> +
>  static inline bool ceph_vino_is_reserved(const struct ceph_vino
> vino)
>  {
>  	if (vino.ino >= CEPH_INO_SYSTEM_BASE ||