Re: [PATCH 0/2] mount: add OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Mon, 19 Jan 2026 11:05:14 -0800
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.initramfs,dev.linux.lists.containers,org.kernel.vger.linux-api,org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CALCETrWs59ss3ZMdTH54p3=E_jiYXq2SWV1fmm+HSvZ1pnBiJw@mail.gmail.com> |
On Mon, Jan 19, 2026 at 10:56=E2=80=AFAM Askar Safin <[email protected]>= wrote: > > Christian Brauner <[email protected]>: > > Extend open_tree() with a new OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE flag. Similar to > > OPEN_TREE_CLONE only the indicated mount tree is copied. Instead of > > returning a file descriptor referring to that mount tree > > OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE will cause open_tree() to return a file descriptor > > to a new mount namespace. In that new mount namespace the copied mount > > tree has been mounted on top of a copy of the real rootfs. > > I want to point at security benefits of this. > > [[ TL;DR: [1] and [2] are very big changes to how mount namespaces work. > I like them, and I think they should get wider exposure. ]] > > If this patchset ([1]) and [2] both land (they are both in "next" now and > likely will be submitted to mainline soon) and "nullfs_rootfs" is passed = on > command line, then mount namespace created by open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPA= CE) will > usually contain exactly 2 mounts: nullfs and whatever was passed to > open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE). > > This means that even if attacker somehow is able to unmount its root and > get access to underlying mounts, then the only underlying thing they will > get is nullfs. > > Also this means that other mounts are not only hidden in new namespace, t= hey > are fully absent. This prevents attacks discussed here: [3], [4]. > > Also this means that (assuming we have both [1] and [2] and "nullfs_rootf= s" > is passed), there is no anymore hidden writable mount shared by all conta= iners, > potentially available to attackers. This is concern raised in [5]: > > > You want rootfs to be a NULLFS instead of ramfs. You don't seem to want= it to > > actually _be_ a filesystem. Even with your "fix", containers could comm= unicate > > with each _other_ through it if it becomes accessible. If a container c= an get > > access to an empty initramfs and write into it, it can ask/answer the q= uestion > > "Are there any other containers on this machine running stux24" and the= n coordinate. I think this new OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE is nifty, but I don't think the path that gives it sensible behavior should be conditional like this. Either make it *always* mount on top of nullfs (regardless of boot options) or find some way to have it actually be the root. I assume the latter is challenging for some reason. --Andy