[PATCH 2/3] AF_ALG: Drop support for off-CPU cryptography

Demi Marie Obenour via B4 Relay <[email protected]>
Newsgroups org.kernel.vger.io-uring,org.kernel.feeds.b4-sent,org.kernel.vger.linux-crypto,org.kernel.vger.linux-doc,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-perf-users,org.kernel.vger.netdev
Message-ID <[email protected]>
From: Demi Marie Obenour <[email protected]>

AF_ALG is deprecated and exposed to unprivileged userspace.  Only
use the least buggy algorithm implementations: the pure software ones.

This removes one of the main advantages of AF_ALG, which is the
ability to use it with off-CPU accelerators.  However, using off-CPU
accelerators has huge overheads, both in performance and attack surface.
I have yet to see real-world, performance-critical workloads where using
an accelerator via AF_ALG is actually a win over doing cryptography in
userspace.

If using an off-CPU accelerator really does turn out to be a win, a new
API should be developed that is actually a good fit for it.

Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst |  7 ++++++-
 crypto/af_alg.c                       |  2 +-
 crypto/algif_aead.c                   |  4 ++--
 crypto/algif_hash.c                   |  4 ++--
 crypto/algif_rng.c                    |  4 ++--
 crypto/algif_skcipher.c               |  4 ++--
 include/crypto/if_alg.h               | 14 +++++++++++++-
 7 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst b/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst
index ea1b1b3f4049fd4673528dc2a6234f6376a3489f..b31117d4415dda6ad6ca36275e615bec7df9552e 100644
--- a/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst
+++ b/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ symmetric cipher, AEAD, and RNG algorithms that are implemented in kernel-mode
 code.
 
 AF_ALG is insecure and is deprecated. Originally added to the kernel in 2010,
-most kernel developers now consider it to be a mistake.
+most kernel developers now consider it to be a mistake. Support for hardware
+accelerators, which was the original purpose of AF_ALG, has been removed.
 
 AF_ALG continues to be supported only for backwards compatibility. On systems
 where no programs using AF_ALG remain, the support for it should be disabled by
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ Some of the examples include:
 - CVE-2013-7421
 - CVE-2011-4081
 
+Hardware accelerator drivers are frequently buggy. To reduce attack surface,
+AF_ALG now only provides access to algorithms implemented in software. This
+means that AF_ALG no longer fulfills its original purpose.
+
 It is recommended that, whenever possible, userspace programs be migrated to
 userspace crypto code (which again, is what is normally used anyway) and
 ``CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_*`` be disabled.  On systems that use SELinux, SELinux
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 8ccf7a737cd6ca9a5d5bf47050c9afea0dfd61bf..cce000e8590e469927b5a5a0ceccfdf0ef54633d 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int add
 	if (IS_ERR(type))
 		return PTR_ERR(type);
 
-	private = type->bind(sa->salg_name, sa->salg_feat, sa->salg_mask);
+	private = type->bind(sa->salg_name);
 	if (IS_ERR(private)) {
 		module_put(type->owner);
 		return PTR_ERR(private);
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index 60f06597cb0b13036bc975641a0b02ea8a41ad03..787aac8aeb24eed128f08345ba730478113919b3 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -342,9 +342,9 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_aead_ops_nokey = {
 	.poll		=	af_alg_poll,
 };
 
-static void *aead_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static void *aead_bind(const char *name)
 {
-	return crypto_alloc_aead(name, type, mask);
+	return crypto_alloc_aead(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK);
 }
 
 static void aead_release(void *private)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 4d3dfc60a16a6d8b677d903d209df18d67202c98..5452ad6c15069c3cb0ff78fe58868fe7ce4b0fc3 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -380,9 +380,9 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops_nokey = {
 	.accept		=	hash_accept_nokey,
 };
 
-static void *hash_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static void *hash_bind(const char *name)
 {
-	return crypto_alloc_ahash(name, type, mask);
+	return crypto_alloc_ahash(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK);
 }
 
 static void hash_release(void *private)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_rng.c b/crypto/algif_rng.c
index a9fb492e929a70c94476f296f5f5e7c42f0313b7..4dfe7899f8fa4ce82d5f2236297230fb44bc35d6 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_rng.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_rng.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static struct proto_ops __maybe_unused algif_rng_test_ops = {
 	.sendmsg	=	rng_test_sendmsg,
 };
 
-static void *rng_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static void *rng_bind(const char *name)
 {
 	struct rng_parent_ctx *pctx;
 	struct crypto_rng *rng;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static void *rng_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
 	if (!pctx)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-	rng = crypto_alloc_rng(name, type, mask);
+	rng = crypto_alloc_rng(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK);
 	if (IS_ERR(rng)) {
 		kfree(pctx);
 		return ERR_CAST(rng);
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index 9dbccabd87b13920c27aff5a450a235cc6a27d59..df20bdfe1f1f4e453782dee3b743dd1939ab4c6c 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_skcipher_ops_nokey = {
 	.poll		=	af_alg_poll,
 };
 
-static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name)
 {
-	return crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, type, mask);
+	return crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK);
 }
 
 static void skcipher_release(void *private)
diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h
index 62867daca47d76c9ea1a7ed233188788c5f6c3c0..7643ba954125aba0c06aaf19de087985325885ad 100644
--- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct af_alg_control {
 };
 
 struct af_alg_type {
-	void *(*bind)(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask);
+	void *(*bind)(const char *name);
 	void (*release)(void *private);
 	int (*setkey)(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen);
 	int (*setentropy)(void *private, sockptr_t entropy, unsigned int len);
@@ -243,4 +243,16 @@ int af_alg_get_rsgl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int flags,
 		    struct af_alg_async_req *areq, size_t maxsize,
 		    size_t *outlen);
 
+/*
+ * Mask used to disable unsupported algorithm implementations.
+ *
+ * This is the same as FSCRYPT_CRYPTOAPI_MASK in fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h.
+ * In additions to the motivations there, this API is exposed to userspace
+ * that might not be fully trusted.
+ */
+#define AF_ALG_CRYPTOAPI_MASK                             \
+	(CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY | \
+	 CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY)
+
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_IF_ALG_H */

-- 
2.54.0
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