Re: Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV bypass via io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.io-uring,org.infradead.lists.linux-nvme,org.kernel.vger.linux-block,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 6/16/26 2:16 PM, Bryam Vargas wrote: > Hello Micka?l, and Landlock / io_uring folks, > > A task confined by a Landlock ruleset that grants READ_FILE/WRITE_FILE > on a block or NVMe character device but withholds > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV can still reach the device-command > surface through io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD with the IOCTL_DEV check > bypassed: the request enters the device-command handler (block > discard, or the NVMe char-device passthrough) where the equivalent > ioctl(2) is denied. The destructive completion and the NVMe-admin > surface follow from the code -- see Impact. I've said this before, but apparently it hasn't been received - this isn't an io_uring issue. If landlock is missing a hook, then that's on landlock and they should add it. Other security handlers already have that. Hence no need to broadcast this to a bunch of lists, it's strictly a landlock issue. -- Jens Axboe