Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
Nayna Jain <[email protected]> Wed, 8 Apr 2026 20:41:20 -0400
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 4/8/26 4:26 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Mon, Apr 06, 2026 at 10:42:00PM -0400, Nayna Jain wrote: >> On 3/24/26 7:00 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >>> TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a >>> feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for >>> trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags. >>> >>> Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden >>> the feature as follows: >>> >>> 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be >>> used. >>> 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump. >>> >>> Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing >>> trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line. >>> >>> Cc: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> >>> Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> >>> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ >>> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> >>> --- >>> v2: >>> - Implement for all trusted keys backends. >>> - Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full >>> coverage. >>> --- >>> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 18 +++++------- >>> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++ >>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 4 +-- >>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------ >>> 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h >>> index 03527162613f..620a1f890b6b 100644 >>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h >>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h >>> @@ -83,18 +83,16 @@ struct trusted_key_source { >>> extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; >>> -#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 >>> - >>> -#if TRUSTED_DEBUG >>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG >>> static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) >>> { >>> - pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); >>> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, >>> - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); >>> - pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); >>> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, >>> - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); >>> - pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); >>> + pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); >>> + print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, >>> + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); >>> + pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); >>> + print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, >>> + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); >>> + pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); >>> } >>> #else >>> static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) >>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig >>> index 9e00482d886a..2ad9ba0e03f1 100644 >>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig >>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig >>> @@ -1,10 +1,25 @@ >>> config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS >>> bool >>> +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG >>> + bool >>> + >>> +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG >>> + bool "Debug trusted keys" >>> + depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG >>> + default n >>> + help >>> + Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug dumps >>> + can opt-in that feature here. Dumps must only use DEBUG >>> + level output, as sensitive data may pass by. In the >>> + kernel-command line traces can be enabled via >>> + trusted.dyndbg='+p'. >> Would it be good idea to add an explicit note/warning: >> >> >> NOTE: This option is intended for debugging purposes only. Do not enable on >> production systems as debug output may expose sensitive cryptographic >> material. >> If you are unsure, say N. >> >> Apart from this, looks good to me. >> >> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> > Thank, I'll add your tag but would you mind quickly screening v3 again > where I add "trusted.debug=0|1". And yes, your suggestion about extra > warning makes sense. Sure Jarkko.. However, I don't see v3 version in my inbox or in linux-integrity. Or you are about to post it soon. > > Let's make this safe as possible. Mistakes do happen... and then those > measures pay off :-) Yes agree. > > BR, Jarkko Thanks & Regards, - Nayna