Re: [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:03:58 +0530
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 4/9/26 9:37 PM, Jarkko Sakinen wrote: > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> > > TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a > feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for trusted > keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags. > > Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden the > feature as follows: > > 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be > used. > 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump. > 3. Require trusted.debug=1 on the kernel command line (default: 0) to > activate dumps at runtime, even when CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y. > > Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing > trusted.dyndbg='+p' and trusted.debug=1 in the kernel command-line. > > Cc: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> > Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Tested on PKWM and emulated TPM backends. Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> > --- > v3: > - Add kernel-command line option for enabling the traces. > - Add safety information to the Kconfig entry. > v2: > - Implement for all trusted keys backends. > - Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full > coverage. > --- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 21 ++++++----- > security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 7 ++-- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 ++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 44 +++++++++++++---------- > 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > index 03527162613f..9f9940482da4 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > @@ -83,18 +83,21 @@ struct trusted_key_source { > > extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; > > -#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 > +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > +extern bool trusted_debug; > > -#if TRUSTED_DEBUG > static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) > { > - pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); > - pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); > - pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); > + if (!trusted_debug) > + return; > + > + pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); > + print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); > + pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); > + print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); > + pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); > } > #else > static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig > index 9e00482d886a..c1ae7db1f612 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig > @@ -1,10 +1,29 @@ > config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS > bool > > +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > + bool > + > +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > + bool "Debug trusted keys" > + depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > + default n > + help > + Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug traces can > + opt-in that feature here. Traces must only use debug level output, as > + sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can be > + enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'. > + > + SAFETY: Debug dumps are inactive at runtime until trusted.debug=1 is > + set on the kernel command-line. Use at your utmost consideration when > + enabling this feature on a production build. The general advice is not > + to do this. > + > config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM > bool "TPM-based trusted keys" > depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS > default y > + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO > select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 > select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS > @@ -23,6 +42,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE > bool "TEE-based trusted keys" > depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS > default y > + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS > help > Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted > @@ -33,6 +53,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM > depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS > select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN > default y > + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS > help > Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module > @@ -42,6 +63,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP > bool "DCP-based trusted keys" > depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS > default y > + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS > help > Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. > @@ -50,6 +72,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM > bool "PKWM-based trusted keys" > depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS > default y > + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS > help > Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend. > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c > index 601943ce0d60..6a33dbf2a7f5 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c > @@ -28,10 +28,13 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { > {opt_err, NULL} > }; > > -#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG > +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) > { > - pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); > + if (!trusted_debug) > + return; > + > + pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); > } > #else > static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > index 9046123d94de..9ce2459d14b4 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ static char *trusted_rng = "default"; > module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0); > MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > +bool trusted_debug; > +module_param_named(debug, trusted_debug, bool, 0); > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Enable trusted keys debug traces (default: 0)"); > +#endif > + > static char *trusted_key_source; > module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); > MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam, dcp or pkwm)"); > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > index c865c97aa1b4..b9fa2b4205cf 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > @@ -46,38 +46,44 @@ enum { > SRK_keytype = 4 > }; > > -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 > - > -#if TPM_DEBUG > +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG > static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) > { > - pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > + if (!trusted_debug) > + return; > + > + pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); > + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); > + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); > + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); > + print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); > } > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) > { > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); > - pr_info("secret:\n"); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); > - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); > + if (!trusted_debug) > + return; > + > + print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); > + pr_debug("secret:\n"); > + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); > + pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); > + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, > + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); > } > > static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) > { > int len; > > - pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); > + if (!trusted_debug) > + return; > + pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n"); > len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); > + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); > } > #else > static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)