Re: [PATCH] asymmetric_keys: check asymmetric_key_ids() for NULL before dereference
Weiming Shi <[email protected]> Fri, 1 May 2026 15:48:34 +0800
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-crypto |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 26-05-01 06:37, Ignat Korchagin wrote: > Hi, > > Thanks for the report. > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 7:17 PM Weiming Shi <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > asymmetric_key_ids() returns key->payload.data[asym_key_ids], which can > > be NULL for keys parsed by the PKCS#8 parser (pkcs8_parser.c explicitly > > stores NULL in prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids]). > > > > key_or_keyring_common() in restrict.c and find_asymmetric_key() in > > asymmetric_type.c both dereference this return value without checking > > for NULL. An unprivileged user can trigger a NULL pointer dereference > > in key_or_keyring_common() by creating a PKCS#8 key, restricting a > > keyring with key_or_keyring:<pkcs8_serial>, and adding an X.509 cert > > to the restricted keyring. CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER=y is > > Could you add a simple bash script for this to the commit message? > Hi Ignat, Sure, here is a bash reproducer: ``` #!/bin/bash modprobe pkcs8_key_parser 2>/dev/null openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:1024 \ -out /tmp/poc.pem 2>/dev/null openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -in /tmp/poc.pem \ -outform DER -out /tmp/poc.p8 openssl req -new -x509 -key /tmp/poc.pem -outform DER \ -out /tmp/poc.der -days 365 -subj "/CN=Test" \ -addext "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" \ -addext "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always" 2>/dev/null PKCS8_ID=$(keyctl padd asymmetric pkcs8key @s < /tmp/poc.p8) KR=$(keyctl newring test_kr @s) keyctl restrict_keyring $KR asymmetric "key_or_keyring:$PKCS8_ID" keyctl padd asymmetric trigger $KR < /tmp/poc.der rm -f /tmp/poc.pem /tmp/poc.p8 /tmp/poc.der ``` If you'd prefer it in the commit message I can send a v2. Thanks, Weiming Shi > > required. > > > > Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000 > > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] > > RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279) > > Call Trace: > > <TASK> > > __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884) > > key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021) > > __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134) > > do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) > > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) > > </TASK> > > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception > > > > Add a NULL check in find_asymmetric_key(), mirroring the existing > > pattern in asymmetric_match_key_ids() and asymmetric_key_describe(). > > In key_or_keyring_common(), skip the trusted key matching when it > > has no key IDs and fall through to the check_dest path. > > > > Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID") > > Reported-by: Xiang Mei <[email protected]> > > Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <[email protected]> > > --- > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 2 ++ > > crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 9 ++++++--- > > 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, > > if (id_0 && id_1) { > > const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); > > > > + if (!kids) > > + goto reject; > > if (!kids->id[1]) { > > pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n"); > > goto reject; > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > @@ -243,10 +243,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, > > if (IS_ERR(key)) > > key = NULL; > > } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { > > + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; > > const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids; > > > > - signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **) > > - asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id; > > + kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); > > + if (!kids) > > + goto skip_trusted; > > + > > + signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id; > > > > /* > > * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the > > @@ -290,6 +294,7 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, > > } > > } > > > > +skip_trusted: > > if (check_dest && !key) { > > /* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */ > > key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], > > -- > > 2.39.0 > > > > Ignat