Re: [PATCH v2] asymmetric_keys: check asymmetric_key_ids() for NULL before dereference
Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Thu, 25 Jun 2026 01:34:13 +0300
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-crypto |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, Jun 22, 2026 at 09:21:04PM +0100, Ignat Korchagin wrote: > On Mon, Jun 22, 2026 at 3:56 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 22, 2026 at 12:16:07PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > > > On Sat, May 02, 2026 at 09:33:29AM -0700, Weiming Shi wrote: > > > > > > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > > > index 16a7ae16593c..22f04656d529 100644 > > > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > > > > @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, > > > > if (id_0 && id_1) { > > > > const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); > > > > > > > > + if (!kids) > > > > + goto reject; > > > > > > This check is actually unnecessary because we've already matched > > > the key against the kid so it must be present. > > > > > > I'd get rid of this check or perhaps add a comment instead. > > > > +1 > > > > > > > > > if (!kids->id[1]) { > > > > pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n"); > > > > goto reject; > > > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > > > index 86292965f493..ccf1084f720e 100644 > > > > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > > > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c > > > > @@ -243,10 +243,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, > > > > if (IS_ERR(key)) > > > > key = NULL; > > > > } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { > > > > + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; > > > > const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids; > > > > > > > > - signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **) > > > > - asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id; > > > > + kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); > > > > + if (!kids) > > > > + goto skip_trusted; > > > > > > Yes this is definitely buggy. > > > > > > I think it was introduced by these two commits: > > > > > > commit 3c58b2362ba828ee2970c66c6a6fd7b04fde4413 > > > Author: David Howells <[email protected]> > > > Date: Tue Oct 9 17:47:46 2018 +0100 > > > > > > KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2] > > > > > > and > > > > > > commit 7e3c4d22083f6e7316c5229b6197ca2d5335aa35 > > > Author: Mat Martineau <[email protected]> > > > Date: Mon Jun 27 16:45:16 2016 -0700 > > > > > > KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain > > > > > > So the Fixes header should point to them. > > > > +1 > > > > > > > > > @@ -290,6 +294,7 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, > > > > } > > > > } > > > > > > > > +skip_trusted: > > > > if (check_dest && !key) { > > > > /* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */ > > > > key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], > > > > > > I'm not sure continuing here is a good idea. Having a private key > > > here makes no sense whatsoever and we should just bail out right > > > away. > > > > > > I would recommend returning an error of some sort if kids is NULL. > > > > > > David/Lukas/Ignat, any opinions? > > As I reread the original submission (somehow I never got the V2) it > seems we're restricting a keyring with a private key?! Which indeed > does not make sense. > > > I think with a quick skim that you are right. I'll work on this area > > for the next version. BTW I was writing two emails simulatenously this last sentence was for private email discussion. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > -- > > > Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> > > > Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ > > > PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt > > > > Thanks for the review! And this. > > > > BR, Jarkko > > > > +1's were for the discussion. Sorry, I should not multitask with emails... BR, Jarkko