Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
Jan Sebastian Götte <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.infradead.lists.kexec,org.kernel.vger.linux-devicetree,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module,org.kvack.linux-mm |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 8/11/26 17:14, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote: > On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: >> On 8/11/26 16:53, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote: >>> On 7/31/26 18:27, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: >>>> Register a CRASH_ZEROIZE notifier that wipes secretmem folios. As a >>>> result, when CONFIG_CRASH_ZEROIZE is set, secretmem areas will be >>>> cleared before the kdump kernel is kexec'ed. >>> >>> Are you actually using secretmem in your use case? I heard some rumors that >>> secretmem isn't used all that much in practice :) >> >> I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of >> secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case. >> While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as >> wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional >> defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users >> who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read >> primitives so I think everyone wins here. > > What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are > irrelevant in practice. > > Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case? I'm in fact going to start using secretmem.