[RFC PATCH v1 34/42] x86/realmode: skip the sub-1M trampoline for the VBS secure plane

The VBS secure plane (plane >0) boots from a single high-memory region
carved out of the normal plane's address space and therefore has no
sub-1M RAM for the x86 real-mode AP trampoline.  reserve_real_mode()
followed by init_real_mode() then panics with "Real mode trampoline was
not allocated".

The secure plane is uniprocessor, enters directly in long mode and never
uses the trampoline, so point x86_platform.realmode_reserve/realmode_init
at x86_init_noop for it.  This mirrors how the Hyper-V VTL (hv_vtl.c) and
Xen PV ports disable the trampoline.

Gated at compile time on CONFIG_VBS_SECURE_MONITOR (only the secure-plane
kernel sets it) and at runtime on the "secure_monitor" early param (the
normal plane never passes it), so plane 0 is unaffected.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 17 +++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          | 36 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h         | 12 +++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/realmode/init.c        | 26 ++++++++++
 include/linux/kvm_host.h        | 35 ++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |  1 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c             |  6 +++
 8 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b7d478dcc1a5..bbccb9d3d801 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -380,15 +380,24 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 		 */
 		unsigned cr4_smep:1;
 
-		unsigned:3;
+		/*
+		 * Plane (privilege level) that owns this shadow page.  VM
+		 * planes share memslots but must have independent page
+		 * tables so that a higher-privilege plane can restrict a
+		 * lower plane's access (e.g. deny reads of secure-plane
+		 * memory).  Tagging the role keeps each plane's roots and
+		 * SPTEs separate.  Always 0 when CONFIG_VM_PLANES is off.
+		 */
+		unsigned plane:4;
 
 		/*
 		 * This is left at the top of the word so that
 		 * kvm_memslots_for_spte_role can extract it with a
-		 * simple shift.  While there is room, give it a whole
-		 * byte so it is also faster to load it from memory.
+		 * simple shift.  smm is only ever used as a boolean, so it
+		 * is reduced to 7 bits (from a full byte) to make room for
+		 * cr4_smep and the VM-planes plane tag above.
 		 */
-		unsigned smm:8;
+		unsigned smm:7;
 	};
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 6e41c5df72ed..960e212c5ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4708,6 +4708,34 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * A higher-privilege plane may forbid this plane from accessing a gfn
+	 * (e.g. to hide secure-plane memory from the normal plane).  Two cases
+	 * cannot be represented as a present SPTE and must be denied outright,
+	 * exiting to userspace with a memory fault rather than (re)building an
+	 * SPTE the access will immediately re-fault on:
+	 *
+	 *  - NO_READ: there is no present-but-unreadable EPT entry, so leave the
+	 *    gfn unmapped for this plane.
+	 *
+	 *  - NO_WRITE on a write fault: make_spte() strips ACC_WRITE_MASK and
+	 *    builds a read-only SPTE, so a guest write would re-fault forever
+	 *    (an unresolvable EPT write-violation livelock).  Deny it instead so
+	 *    the violation is visible and can be mediated (e.g. HEKI text_poke
+	 *    is routed through the secure plane rather than written directly).
+	 */
+	{
+		unsigned long plane_attrs =
+			kvm_plane_access_attributes(vcpu->plane, fault->gfn);
+
+		if ((plane_attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_READ) ||
+		    (fault->write &&
+		     (plane_attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_WRITE))) {
+			kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (unlikely(!slot))
 		return kvm_handle_noslot_fault(vcpu, fault, access);
 
@@ -5884,6 +5912,14 @@ kvm_calc_tdp_mmu_root_page_role(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	role.direct = true;
 	role.has_4_byte_gpte = false;
 
+	/*
+	 * Give each VM plane its own TDP root.  Planes share memslots but
+	 * need independent page tables so a higher-privilege plane can
+	 * restrict a lower plane's access to a GFN.  plane_level is 0 (and
+	 * thus a no-op) on non-plane VMs and when CONFIG_VM_PLANES is off.
+	 */
+	role.plane = vcpu->plane_level;
+
 	/* All TDP pages are supervisor-executable */
 	role.access = ACC_ALL;
 	if (role.cr4_smep && shadow_user_mask)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 144f7c5a1040..ed03bcdbf82d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -580,9 +580,13 @@ void __init kvm_mmu_spte_module_init(void);
 void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void);
 
 /*
- * Apply memory protection attributes to pte_access.
- * If memory attributes have NO_WRITE or NO_EXEC set for a GFN,
- * strip the corresponding access bits before building the SPTE.
+ * Apply cross-plane access restrictions to pte_access when building an SPTE
+ * for the faulting plane.  A higher-privilege plane may downgrade a lower
+ * plane's access to a GFN via its per-plane access_attr_array.  NO_WRITE and
+ * NO_EXEC are enforced here by stripping the corresponding access bits.
+ * NO_READ cannot be expressed as a present-but-unreadable SPTE on EPT, so it
+ * is enforced earlier in the fault handler (kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn) by refusing
+ * to map the page.
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
 static inline unsigned int kvm_plane_filter_pte_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -591,7 +595,7 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_plane_filter_pte_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	unsigned long attrs;
 
-	attrs = kvm_get_memory_attributes(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
+	attrs = kvm_plane_access_attributes(vcpu->plane, gfn);
 	if (attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_WRITE)
 		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
 	if (attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_EXEC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3c73ab1dcfe8..c8c37d569023 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10494,6 +10494,61 @@ static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_VM_PLANES) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES)
+/*
+ * Apply cross-plane access restrictions requested by a higher-privilege plane.
+ * Stores @attrs (NO_READ/NO_WRITE/NO_EXEC) for [@start, @end) in @plane's
+ * access_attr_array and zaps the range so any pages already mapped in @plane's
+ * EPT re-fault and pick up the restriction.  @attrs == 0 clears the
+ * restriction for the range.
+ */
+static int kvm_plane_set_access_attrs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_plane *plane,
+				      gfn_t start, gfn_t end, unsigned long attrs)
+{
+	void *entry = attrs ? xa_mk_value(attrs) : NULL;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reserve slots up front so the store loop below cannot fail partway
+	 * through and leave a gap (a still-readable page) in the protected
+	 * range.  Clearing a restriction (entry == NULL) never allocates.
+	 */
+	if (entry) {
+		for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
+			r = xa_reserve(&plane->access_attr_array, gfn,
+				       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+			if (r)
+				goto out_unlock;
+
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn++) {
+		r = xa_err(xa_store(&plane->access_attr_array, gfn, entry,
+				    GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(r, kvm))
+			goto out_unlock;
+
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Re-fault the affected gfns in the plane's EPT so the new restriction
+	 * takes effect on existing mappings.  Zapping all roots is harmless;
+	 * other planes simply rebuild identical entries on next access.
+	 */
+	kvm_zap_gfn_range(kvm, start, end);
+
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_VM_PLANES && CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
+
 int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
 			      int (*complete_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *))
 {
@@ -10683,16 +10738,21 @@ int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
 	case KVM_HC_VBS_SET_MEM_ATTRS:
 #if defined(CONFIG_VM_PLANES) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES)
 		/*
-		 * The secure plane (plane >0) enforces EPT permissions on the
-		 * normal plane's memory.  It cannot issue the host
+		 * The secure plane (plane >0) enforces EPT permissions on a
+		 * lower plane's memory.  It cannot issue the host
 		 * KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, so it asks KVM to do it via
-		 * this hypercall.  Only a higher-privilege plane may call it.
+		 * this hypercall.  Only a higher-privilege plane may call it;
+		 * the restriction is applied to the plane directly below the
+		 * caller.
 		 *
 		 *   a0 = guest-physical address (page aligned)
 		 *   a1 = region size in bytes  (page aligned)
-		 *   a2 = access bits to retain for lower planes:
-		 *        bit0 read (implicit), bit1 write, bit2 exec
-		 *        (matches VBS_MEM_READ/WRITE/EXEC)
+		 *   a2 = access bits to retain for the lower plane:
+		 *        bit0 read, bit1 write, bit2 exec
+		 *        (matches VBS_MEM_READ/WRITE/EXEC).  A cleared bit adds
+		 *        the corresponding NO_READ/NO_WRITE/NO_EXEC restriction;
+		 *        a2 = 0 hides the range entirely (e.g. secure-plane
+		 *        memory that the normal plane must not read).
 		 */
 		if (vcpu->plane_level == 0) {
 			ret = -KVM_EPERM;
@@ -10704,17 +10764,26 @@ int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
 			ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		} else {
+			struct kvm_plane *target;
 			unsigned long attrs = 0;
 			gfn_t start = a0 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 			gfn_t end = (a0 + a1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
+			target = vcpu->kvm->planes[vcpu->plane_level - 1];
+			if (!target) {
+				ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if (!(a2 & BIT(0)))
+				attrs |= KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_READ;
 			if (!(a2 & BIT(1)))
 				attrs |= KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_WRITE;
 			if (!(a2 & BIT(2)))
 				attrs |= KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_EXEC;
 
-			if (kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(vcpu->kvm, start, end,
-						      attrs))
+			if (kvm_plane_set_access_attrs(vcpu->kvm, target, start,
+						       end, attrs))
 				ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
 			else
 				ret = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 694d80a5c68e..01855a913b10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <asm/crash.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/x86_init.h>
 
 struct real_mode_header *real_mode_header;
 u32 *trampoline_cr4_features;
@@ -44,6 +45,31 @@ void load_trampoline_pgtable(void)
 	__flush_tlb_all();
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VBS_SECURE_MONITOR
+/*
+ * A KVM VM-planes secure plane (plane > 0) is entered directly in 64-bit long
+ * mode and boots from a single carved-out high-memory region that contains no
+ * RAM below 1 MiB.  It runs uniprocessor with no firmware, ACPI sleep, or
+ * hibernation, so the 16-bit real-mode trampoline can neither be allocated
+ * (there is no sub-1M memory) nor is it ever used (no AP bringup or wakeup).
+ *
+ * Disable the real-mode setup the same way Hyper-V VTL and Xen PV do, by
+ * pointing the x86_platform real-mode hooks at the no-op handler.  This is
+ * installed from an early_param so it takes effect before setup_arch() calls
+ * x86_platform.realmode_reserve().  Triggered by the "secure_monitor"
+ * command-line option, the same switch that activates the in-kernel
+ * secure-plane monitor.
+ */
+static int __init secure_plane_no_real_mode(char *arg)
+{
+	x86_platform.realmode_reserve = x86_init_noop;
+	x86_platform.realmode_init = x86_init_noop;
+	pr_info("realmode: secure plane: skipping sub-1M trampoline\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("secure_monitor", secure_plane_no_real_mode);
+#endif /* CONFIG_VBS_SECURE_MONITOR */
+
 void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
 {
 	phys_addr_t mem, limit = x86_init.resources.realmode_limit;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index f14d78fd8cd3..05c9edd4a73d 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -895,6 +895,18 @@ struct kvm_plane {
 	/* Per-Plane VCPU array */
 	struct xarray vcpu_array;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+	/*
+	 * Cross-plane access restrictions imposed on THIS plane by a
+	 * higher-privilege plane.  Each entry holds NO_READ/NO_WRITE/NO_EXEC
+	 * bits for a gfn and is enforced when building this plane's SPTEs
+	 * (planes have independent EPT roots).  Distinct from
+	 * kvm->mem_attr_array, which holds VM-wide PRIVATE/CoCo attributes.
+	 * Protected by kvm->slots_lock for writes, RCU for reads.
+	 */
+	struct xarray access_attr_array;
+#endif
+
 	struct kvm_arch_plane arch;
 };
 
@@ -2739,6 +2751,29 @@ static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+/*
+ * Cross-plane access restrictions: a higher-privilege plane downgrades a
+ * lower plane's access (NO_READ/NO_WRITE/NO_EXEC) to a gfn by storing bits in
+ * that lower plane's access_attr_array.  Enforced when building the lower
+ * plane's SPTEs (planes have independent EPT roots).  Returns 0 when no
+ * restriction applies.
+ */
+static inline unsigned long kvm_plane_access_attributes(struct kvm_plane *plane,
+							gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	if (!plane)
+		return 0;
+	return xa_to_value(xa_load(&plane->access_attr_array, gfn));
+}
+#else
+static inline unsigned long kvm_plane_access_attributes(struct kvm_plane *plane,
+							gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_VM_PLANES */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
 int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 		     gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, struct page **page,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 348628c7b17e..3118b31d13f6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1688,6 +1688,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_attributes {
 #define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE           (1ULL << 3)
 #define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_WRITE          (1ULL << 4)
 #define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_EXEC           (1ULL << 5)
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_READ           (1ULL << 6)
 
 #define KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD	_IOWR(KVMIO,  0xd4, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd)
 #define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP		(1ULL << 0)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 553c282500fd..3a1a09f26340 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1236,6 +1236,9 @@ static struct kvm_plane *kvm_create_plane(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned plane_level)
 	plane->level = plane_level;
 
 	xa_init(&plane->vcpu_array);
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+	xa_init(&plane->access_attr_array);
+#endif
 
 	if (kvm_arch_plane_init(kvm, plane, plane_level))
 		goto out_free_plane;
@@ -1254,6 +1257,9 @@ static struct kvm_plane *kvm_create_plane(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned plane_level)
 static void kvm_destroy_one_plane(struct kvm_plane *plane)
 {
 	kvm_arch_plane_destroy(plane);
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+	xa_destroy(&plane->access_attr_array);
+#endif
 	kvm_free_plane(plane);
 }
 
-- 
2.55.0