[PATCH v3] smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area

Shoichiro Miyamoto <[email protected]>
Newsgroups org.kernel.vger.linux-cifs,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.stable
Message-ID <CADAuDAP9Sq=DyMQXm-mP6+mP8vmV=BdYd7YbTnMOAUTwWn8V8w@mail.gmail.com>
smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response
whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually
received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]").
This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0]
overlap byte when no data area is present.

However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether
the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]).  When a
response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported
data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet
smb2_check_message() still accepts it.  The subsequent decoder then reads
past the end of the receive buffer.  This is reachable during NEGOTIATE
and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established.

The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting
against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the
NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00
  Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
   print_report+0x157/0x4c9
   kasan_report+0xce/0x100
   asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00
   decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30
   SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90
   cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0
   cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0
   cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0
   cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0
   cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500
   smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630
   vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0
   fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0
   path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0
   __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270
   do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>
  Allocated by task 85:
   kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380
   mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0
   cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80
   allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0
   cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50
   kthread+0x2c6/0x390
   ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0)
   which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50
  Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G    B      7.1.0-rc6 #1
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70
   print_report+0x157/0x4c9
   kasan_report+0xce/0x100
   kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50
   decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680
   SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0
   SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0
   cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0
   cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0
   cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0
   cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0
   cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500
   smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630
   vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0
   fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0
   path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0
   __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270
   do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>
  Allocated by task 93:
   kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380
   mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0
   cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80
   allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0
   cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50
   kthread+0x2c6/0x390
   ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
   allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0)
   which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448

Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that
it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for.  When a data area
is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length
overruns the received buffer, so the response must be rejected.

Fixes: 093b2bdad322 ("CIFS: Make demultiplex_thread work with SMB2 code")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Shoichiro Miyamoto <[email protected]>
---
v3: no code changes.  v1 and v2 were corrupted in transit by my mail
    path, which re-wrapped the long "@@ ... @@" hunk-context lines so the
    patch would not apply.  Resent with a base64-encoded body so it is
    transmitted verbatim.  Sorry for the noise.

    v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cifs/CADAuDAPSq+BUcB1SkHqkZsF364mShyE6jsaB+vk9zm=5Q+LHFw@mail.gmail.com/

 fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c
index 2a7355ce1a07..6270b33147d2 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include "nterr.h"
 #include "cached_dir.h"

+static unsigned int __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data);
+
 static int
 check_smb2_hdr(struct smb2_hdr *shdr, __u64 mid)
 {
@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int
pdu_len, unsigned int len,
 	int command;
 	__u32 calc_len; /* calculated length */
 	__u64 mid;
+	bool have_data;

 	/* If server is a channel, select the primary channel */
 	pserver = SERVER_IS_CHAN(server) ? server->primary_server : server;
@@ -228,7 +231,8 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int
pdu_len, unsigned int len,
 		}
 	}

-	calc_len = smb2_calc_size(buf);
+	have_data = false;
+	calc_len = __smb2_calc_size(buf, &have_data);

 	/* For SMB2_IOCTL, OutputOffset and OutputLength are optional, so might
 	 * be 0, and not a real miscalculation */
@@ -247,8 +251,13 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int
pdu_len, unsigned int len,
 		/* Windows 7 server returns 24 bytes more */
 		if (calc_len + 24 == len && command == SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE)
 			return 0;
-		/* server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0] */
-		if (calc_len == len + 1)
+		/*
+		 * Server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0].
+		 * Allow it only when there is no data area; if data_length > 0
+		 * the +1 gap indicates an overreported data length rather than
+		 * the bcc[0] omission.
+		 */
+		if (calc_len == len + 1 && !have_data)
 			return 0;

 		/*
@@ -409,14 +418,17 @@ smb2_get_data_area_len(int *off, int *len,
struct smb2_hdr *shdr)
 /*
  * Calculate the size of the SMB message based on the fixed header
  * portion, the number of word parameters and the data portion of the message.
+ * If have_data is non-NULL, it is set to true when a non-empty data area was
+ * found (data_length > 0), allowing callers to distinguish the implied bcc[0]
+ * case (no data area) from an overreported data length.
  */
-unsigned int
-smb2_calc_size(void *buf)
+static unsigned int
+__smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data)
 {
 	struct smb2_pdu *pdu = buf;
 	struct smb2_hdr *shdr = &pdu->hdr;
 	int offset; /* the offset from the beginning of SMB to data area */
-	int data_length; /* the length of the variable length data area */
+	int data_length = 0; /* the length of the variable length data area */
 	/* Structure Size has already been checked to make sure it is 64 */
 	int len = le16_to_cpu(shdr->StructureSize);

@@ -449,9 +461,17 @@ smb2_calc_size(void *buf)
 	}
 calc_size_exit:
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2 len %d\n", len);
+	if (have_data)
+		*have_data = (data_length > 0);
 	return len;
 }

+unsigned int
+smb2_calc_size(void *buf)
+{
+	return __smb2_calc_size(buf, NULL);
+}
+
 /* Note: caller must free return buffer */
 __le16 *
 cifs_convert_path_to_utf16(const char *from, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
-- 
2.52.0
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.