[PATCH] crypto: hisilicon/sec2: fix CCM algorithm long packet failure
Chenghai Huang <[email protected]> Tue, 4 Aug 2026 10:22:07 +0800
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-crypto,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Zhushuai Yin <[email protected]> In the CCM B0 block the message-length field Q spans L bytes, where L (cl in the driver) is derived from the cipher IV flags byte as c_ivin[0] + 1. set_aead_auth_iv() hardcoded writing only the last 2 bytes of a_ivin with cryptlen, implicitly assuming cl = 2. When cl = 3 (a shorter nonce yielding a 3-byte length field) and the packet is longer than 65535 bytes, cryptlen no longer fits in 2 bytes. The dropped high byte made the auth IV built by the driver differ from the one consumed by the hardware, so the software/hardware comparison failed and the CCM request errored out. Write the last cl bytes of a_ivin in a loop driven by the IV's CL value, so the length-field width always matches the algorithm configuration instead of assuming a fixed 2-byte field. Fixes: c16a70c1f253 ("crypto: hisilicon/sec - add new algorithm mode for AEAD") Signed-off-by: Zhushuai Yin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chenghai Huang <[email protected]> --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c index 01eb76f616fc..0a2f7c8b44fc 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ #define IV_FLAGS_OFFSET 0x6 #define IV_CM_OFFSET 0x3 #define IV_LAST_BYTE1 1 -#define IV_LAST_BYTE2 2 #define IV_LAST_BYTE_MASK 0xFF #define IV_CTR_INIT 0x1 #define IV_BYTE_OFFSET 0x8 @@ -1700,7 +1699,7 @@ static void set_aead_auth_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req; u32 data_size = aead_req->cryptlen; u8 flage = 0; - u8 cm, cl; + u8 cm, cl, i; /* the specification has been checked in aead_iv_demension_check() */ cl = c_req->c_ivin[0] + 1; @@ -1724,15 +1723,16 @@ static void set_aead_auth_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) * the last 32bit is counter's initial number, * but the nonce uses the first 16bit * the tail 16bit fill with the cipher length + * When CL is 3, the tail 24bit fill with the cipher length. */ if (!c_req->encrypt) data_size = aead_req->cryptlen - authsize; - a_req->a_ivin[ctx->c_ctx.ivsize - IV_LAST_BYTE1] = - data_size & IV_LAST_BYTE_MASK; - data_size >>= IV_BYTE_OFFSET; - a_req->a_ivin[ctx->c_ctx.ivsize - IV_LAST_BYTE2] = + for (i = 1; i <= cl; i++) { + a_req->a_ivin[ctx->c_ctx.ivsize - i] = data_size & IV_LAST_BYTE_MASK; + data_size >>= IV_BYTE_OFFSET; + } } static void sec_aead_set_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req) -- 2.43.0