[PATCH v2 4/6] Bluetooth: SMP: clear the aes_cmac_key when done
Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-crypto,org.kernel.vger.linux-bluetooth,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Clear the local aes_cmac_key structure via __cleanup() function when we're done with it to avoid that sensitive data could leak on the stack. While we're at it, also clear the tmp[] array here that is populated with a raw version of the original key and thus would leak the same information via the stack otherwise. Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index c4470958b0d57..4a32e4f80b48a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) static int smp_aes_cmac(const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, size_t len, u8 mac[16]) { uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; - struct aes_cmac_key key; + struct aes_cmac_key key __cleanup(aes_cmac_zeroize_key); int err; if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static int smp_aes_cmac(const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, size_t len, u8 mac[16]) SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k); err = aes_cmac_preparekey(&key, tmp, 16); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) /* Should never happen, as 16 is valid keylen */ return err; aes_cmac(&key, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); -- 2.55.0