[PATCH 7/9] EDAC/versalnet: Add bounds validation in rpmsg_cb()

The firmware-supplied offset and length values from the RPMsg payload
are used without validation to index into mc_priv->regs[] (REG_MAX=152
entries). A malformed or buggy firmware message could write past the end
of the array, corrupting adjacent structure members and the kernel heap.
Add check for the same.

Signed-off-by: Shubhrajyoti Datta <[email protected]>
---

 drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c b/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c
index e9561242f292..baca90f44c58 100644
--- a/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c
+++ b/drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c
@@ -602,6 +602,9 @@ static int rpmsg_cb(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev, void *data,
 	length = result[MSG_ERR_LENGTH];
 	offset = result[MSG_ERR_OFFSET];
 
+	if (offset + length > REG_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/*
 	 * The data can come in two stretches. Construct the regs from two
 	 * messages. The offset indicates the offset from which the data is to
-- 
2.34.1