[PATCH v2] btrfs: allow idmapped DEFRAG ioctls
Tao Cui <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-btrfs,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Tao Cui <[email protected]> btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE against nop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with -EPERM even for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts. The check, added in 616d374efa23 ("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open it O_RDWR, write() to it or fallocate() it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps its capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is. FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers: may_dedupe_file() in fs/remap_range.c compares the inode owner through file_mnt_idmap(file) and falls back to inode_permission() with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag. On regular mounts file_mnt_idmap() is nop_mnt_idmap and nothing changes. Signed-off-by: Tao Cui <[email protected]> --- v2: rewrite the commit message to explain why defrag is safe for idmapped users (Seth Forshee); the code is unchanged. --- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 72bc9d4f7708..607329dedd50 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_defrag(struct file *file, void __user *argp) * running and allows defrag on files open in read-only mode. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && - inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE)) { + inode_permission(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, MAY_WRITE)) { ret = -EPERM; goto out; } -- 2.43.0